







**THE DETHRONEMENT  
OF THE KHEDIVE**



*By the same Author*

**"TWENTY YEARS IN THE NEAR EAST"**

**"THE LIFE OF STAMBOLOFF"**

**A TRANSLATION OF TOLSTOY'S "MASTER & MAN"**

**ETC., ETC.**





BEAMAN IN ARAB HEADDRESS

The  
Dethronement of the Khedive

By ARDERN HULME BEAMAN  
*late C.I.O. in Egypt*

*Edited, with an Introduction, by*  
The Rt. Hon. J. M. Robertson

LONDON  
George Allen & Unwin Ltd  
MUSEUM STREET



## AUTHOR'S FOREWORD

SINCE the War so much has been written on Egypt that it may seem superfluous to add to the bibliography. "Another book on Egypt! Who on earth wants to hear any more about that infernal country just now?" will be the common greeting for this belated outsider.

My excuse is that, either purposely or in ignorance, no adequate or accurate account has ever been given of the circumstances attending the deposition of the Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha. Not only so, but entirely erroneous versions have been published officially and by the most usually recognized authorities on Egypt.

The Ex-Khedive's dethronement and exile had a great influence on the subsequent course of events, and it is for this reason that I have been tempted to endeavour to arrive at the truth, and to discover if possible the authors and motives that led to the extinction of his name and existence in Egypt.

Nothing specific has ever publicly transpired to explain a proceeding which seems to require justification; and should the following pages lead to the revelation of a carefully guarded mystery, they will not have been written in vain.

The question is an academical and historical one, that should not be difficult of proof.

The point is whether Abbas Hilmi Pasha, as every official and non-official version has it, did or did not

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

*"desert his country", and "as soon as the War broke out, adhere to the enemy".* It was for guiltiness of these definitely alleged crimes that he was exiled, and according to his own complaint, despoiled of two-thirds of his fortune.

Incidentally I have been led into hazarding some opinions and comments on the relations that have developed between England and Egypt, but this was almost unavoidable. Such as they are, they come from an almost life-long acquaintance with the country, its language, and its people.

I was attached to the British Consulate-General in 1879, as first Arabic Student Interpreter, and lived in Cairo for about ten years, seeing the Occupation effected and the birth of British control under Lord Cromer. For the last few years before I left I was in daily contact with Sir Evelyn Baring, as he was then called, and with all the prominent British, foreign, and Egyptian personalities of that day. Since then I have frequently visited the country, going through the Dongola Campaign with Kitchener, whom I first knew as a junior officer in the Egyptian Cavalry under Colonel Taylor of the 20th Hussars—and for the last time in 1926, to see my old friends.

I was fortunate enough, amongst others, to find the Grand Mufti, Ismail Pasha Abâza, and Saad Zaghloul, both the latter of whom have since died. During the War I spent several years in Contre-Espionnage, and

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

other Secret Service jobs, as head of various sections in S.S. and G.S.I., and I remained there till 1920. I mention my motley experiences in the Nile Lands to account for the miscellaneous and wide knowledge I had unrivalled opportunities of acquiring from the best sources at first hand, without having recourse to Blue or White Books, which, though they sometimes tell the truth as far as they go, seldom tell the whole truth. Naturally, the best of all sources would be Abbas Hilmi Pasha himself, but it is not easy to get him to talk or give information about himself. For several years, whenever I have had the pleasure of meeting His Highness, I have urged him to write his Memoirs, but he does not appear to have either the time or inclination.

A. H. B.





# CONTENTS

	PAGE
AUTHOR'S FOREWORD	5
INTRODUCTION	15
CHAPTER I	23
<p>Egypt before and under Lord Cromer. Arâbi Pasha. His honesty and his initiative. Cromer's beginnings. Material successes. Neglect of education. Retardation of political life. The problem created for posterity. The new Nationalism. Cromer. Gorst. Kitchener. The treatment accorded to the Khedive. Cromer's final attack.</p>	
CHAPTER II	45
<p>The advent of Kitchener. Resumption of repressive policy. Kitchener's capacities. His political strategies. English criticism. Value of the Five Feddan Law. Imperialistic ideal and policy. The incident of the Mariut Railway. Kitchener ignores an offer of sale; later charges treasonable dealings with aliens; is ordered to purchase the railway as it had been offered. Kitchener and the Wakfs. Disingenuous procedure. Egyptian criticism of his régime. His characteristics.</p>	
CHAPTER III	61
<p>The drama of the deposition. The Khedive at Constantinople in July, 1914. Turkish attempt to assassinate him. His dangerous condition. Desire to return to Cairo on convalescence. Refused permission by the British Ambassador. Ordered to proceed to Naples. Deposed <i>de facto</i> in September, 1914; <i>de jure</i> in December. Falsely accused of deserting his country, and of adhering to the enemy. Residence in Switzerland, and strict neutrality. Equal injustice and unwisdom of the official British course. The Khedive's popularity in Egypt. Summary of the facts and arguments. Total absence of any counter-case. Empty charges of unspecified "intrigue". Transition to the later régime.</p>	

# *Dethronement of the Khedive*

## CHAPTER IV

PAGE  
77

Abbas Pasha in Switzerland. British offers of pecuniary arrangement as price of abdication. Offers refused. Counter-proposal ignored. Scandalous treatment of the Khedivial property by British and Egyptian authorities. Refusal of justice and of accounting. Farcical sales at low prices. Indefensible legislation. Overriding of all legal procedure aiming at rectification. "Decree Laws" passed by King Fuad. Proceedings of the Public Custodian. Policy of eliminating Abbas II.

## CHAPTER V

103

The Ex-Khedive at Lausanne. His Petition of Right to the British Crown. Its rejection. His process before the Anglo-Turkish Arbitral Tribunal. Its technical stultification. Policy of the British Foreign Office. Refusal to permit the Ex-Khedive to visit England.

## CHAPTER VI

112

Later British policy in Egypt. Nominal abolition of the Protectorate. The Zaghloul movement. New Nationalism, in reaction against new imposition of British officialdom. Attitude of Sir R. Wingate. Zaghloul's policy and influence. Supersession of Wingate by General Allenby. Allenby's difficulties. Zaghloul's mission. Strikes of Government workers. Period of disorder. The murders at Deirut. Allenby's measures. The Treaty of Versailles. Changes of Egyptian ministers. Nationalist persistence. Allenby's views. The Milner Mission. Zaghloul's response. Fresh unrest, and deportation of Zaghloul. The Declaration of 1922. Egyptian dissatisfaction. King Fuad and Taoufik Nessim Pasha. Return of Zaghloul.

## CHAPTER VII

132

Zaghloul's Ministry. Policy of the British Labour Ministry of 1924. Zaghloul's persistence. Assassination of Sir Lee Stack. Penal measures of Allenby.

# *Dethronement of the Khedive*

PAGE

Zaghloul's resignation. Protest to League of Nations. Policy of King Fuad. Nashat Pasha. Attitude of the British authority. Egyptian resentment against King Fuad. The advent of Lord Lloyd. His tactics. Sagacity of Ziver Pasha. Arrangement with Zaghloul. Resignation of Judge Kershaw. Situation in 1927. Lord Lloyd's policy of predominance. Concordat with the Palace. The resulting Egyptian situation. Prospects of King Fuad.

## CHAPTER VIII

148

The Treaty to be desired between Great Britain and Egypt. Difficulties of the problem. Need to protect popular rights as well as State independence. The situation in 1927. King Fuad's visit to London. The Wafd and the Coalition Cabinet. The Anglo-Egyptian situation considered. The Soudan. Approximations on both sides. The Reserved Points. The Capitulations. Military occupation. Negligible risk of foreign invasion. The parallel case of Irak. Stronger claims of Egypt. The King's Speech at prorogation of Parliament in 1927.

POSTSCRIPTUM.—The situation in 1928. Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha. Progress in prosperity in Egypt and the Soudan. Lord Lloyd's success.

162

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX I

169

Egyptian native Petition to the Sultan of Turkey in 1882. The Khedive Taoufik Pasha and Arâbi Pasha.

### APPENDIX II

172

Text of Decree-Law No. 28 of 1922.

### APPENDIX III

175

Text of Decree-Law of 1924, Interpretative of Law 28 of 1922.

# *Dethronement of the Khedive*

APPENDIX IV	PAGE 180
Text of sentence of Mixed Arbitral Tribunal of Constantinople in claim of Abbas Hilmi Pasha against the British Government in June, 1927.	
APPENDIX V	187
King Hussein of Arabia. His strange story.	

## ILLUSTRATIONS

THE AUTHOR IN ARAB HEADDRESS	<i>Frontispiece</i>
REPRODUCTION OF LETTER FROM ARÂBI PASHA	29
ABBAS II	<i>Facing page</i> 104



## INTRODUCTION

THIS book was left in my charge for publication by its author, the late Ardern Hulme Beaman, who died on July 23, 1929, aged 72. An accomplished linguist, skilled in Turkish, Arabic, and Russian, as well as in more familiar tongues, he was not a voluminous author; but his knowledge of the Near East during the last fifty years was probably unsurpassed; and his manifold experience as a journalist, in matters calling for exactitude, made him a vigilant narrator. In this, his last book, written in 1927 and revised by him in 1928, he set himself to reveal a strange historical episode which has hitherto entirely escaped public knowledge.

Such a life as his deserves a memoir, for which I have not adequate materials. As is told in *Who's Who*, he originally entered the consular service as student-interpreter. I knew him as an expert in all matters touching Egypt, where he served as an Intelligence Officer during and after the War, with an old Egyptian career behind him; also as the first English translator of a novel by Tolstoy—a performance carried through by him, in his youth, in a week, without a dictionary. He had chosen to follow a political career, and, before the War, had been for a number of years the trusted Paris correspondent of the old *Standard*.

In his last years in London, a wasting illness had



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

impaired his energy, but not his memory or his mental vision; and the book now published has behind it the weight of his personal and official knowledge of all the subject-matter. His special purpose, however, was to bring to light the strange political injustice which had been inflicted in 1914 on the deposed Khedive, Abbas II. And I strongly agreed with him that that act was no less a blunder than an iniquity, and that it was the main cause of most of the trouble that happened in Egypt afterwards.

Beaman was, of course, prepared to be met with indignant incredulity when he related: (1) how Abbas II, accused of "deserting his country" and "adhering to the enemy", had, in fact, been arbitrarily prevented by the British authorities at Constantinople from returning to Egypt when only partially convalescent from the dangerous wounds inflicted in the Turkish attempt to assassinate him, he earnestly desired to resume his duties; (2) how Abbas had been *de facto* deposed, without overt accusation or trial, at a time when he could not possibly have been "adhering to the enemy"; and (3) how he persistently remained neutral under all his wrongs, despite the amazing attempt on the British side to drive him to a residence from which communication with the enemy would at the time have been easy.

As Beaman found throughout his investigations, no answer is forthcoming to those statements. No official

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

explanation has ever been offered of the grounds on which Abbas II was insulted, defamed, and deposed. A bare announcement that he had deserted his country and adhered to the enemy has served to satisfy the British public, with no shadow of proof that Abbas had been in communication with the enemy at all. The pecuniary offers officially made to him in Switzerland during his residence there were a tacit avowal that he was *not* in league with the enemy. Had he been so, no such pecuniary offers would have been made to him. The iniquity of the treatment that had been accorded him stands thus confessed.

Nor has anyone ever told us what could have induced the Khedive to join the Central Powers. The victory of Germany would certainly have meant German annexation of Egypt and India; and to no one can this have been more obvious than it must have been to Abbas II.

There was indeed one episode, upon which Beaman has not touched, that very naturally sufficed to make British readers at the time accept the official announcement. In a collection<sup>1</sup> of extracts from German newspapers published in 1915, there appeared a translation from the report of an interview at Constantinople with the Khedive which appeared in the *Vossische Zeitung* of December 3, 1914. There the Khedive was reported to say, among other things, that "it had become quite impossible to import any goods

<sup>1</sup> *A Month's German Newspapers*, 1915, pp. 80-81.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

other than English into Egypt"—a wild falsity which arouses strong suspicion of invention on the part of the German correspondent. Assuming him, however, to have actually had such an interview as he reports, the latter amounts simply to claiming that the Khedive had expressed admiration for the Kaiser and the German war machine—this at a time when Turkey was in the German grip and the Khedive already *de facto* deposed.

To any intelligent reader, however, it will be obvious that the interview represents only the plight of the harassed and physically suffering victim, compelled to say something agreeable to his German interlocutors, and concerned above all things to get out of enemy territory into neutral Switzerland. Had the cited words stood for any real adherence to the Central Powers, the pecuniary offers made later in Switzerland by the British authorities would never have been thought of. Despite the close espionage there practised, no evidence was ever produced as to any treasonable communication whatever on his part.

That a sovereign so wronged should never have published the story of his betrayal may seem to some Englishmen to mean a tacit acceptance of the charges made. But those who know the Oriental temper, and who consider the position of an Oriental prince, or of a Khedive in particular, will recognize that Abbas saw no way of helping himself. He would reason that

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

his enemies would simply outswear him. They had actually decided to depose him without the semblance of a trial, at a time when he lay dangerously wounded ; and they would simply deny his statement that he had been flatly refused permission to return to Egypt. He could not expect that Englishmen would believe their officials capable of flat mendacity in addition to gross injustice. On the other hand, he could not look for re-instalment, and, unable to forecast the possible changes in British policy in Egypt, he had abundant reason to try all legal methods of recovering some of the property of which he had been plundered. Thus it has come about that the story of his deposition has never been published till now.

I could wish, nevertheless, that the Ex-Khedive had made his own appeal to public opinion, even in a nation which had treated him ill. Investigation might have been provoked. It was within my knowledge that Lord Kitchener, on imperialistic grounds, had aimed at the deposition of Abbas II before the War was dreamed of. As to who inspired or engineered the actual deposition carried through at Constantinople three months before the formal deposition, neither Beaman nor I had any knowledge. It is, however, for the Foreign Office to meet Beaman's damning statements as best it can.

Very justly has he countered the Foreign Office maxim that the Khedive was always hostile and the British Consul always blameless. British opinion, of old,

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

became fixed in the view that a man so financially upright as Cromer was sure to be a model of justice in all other regards. The mistake was one which he had probably made for himself. Anyone who came in intelligent conflict with him must have seen that he felt he could not, or *must* not, rule at Cairo like an English gentleman. The men-of-the-world who elect to applaud seem to forget that to act on that principle meant to give chronic offence and intense provocation. Cromer could behave intolerably to an independent British traveller; and he must have done well-nigh all that he might to make an enemy of the Khedive. Kitchener went further.

As Beaman says and shows, the notion that Cromer and Kitchener were straightforward "plain-dealers" was an absurd delusion. Cromer practised forms of espionage of which, to my knowledge, some of his subordinates were ashamed. Equally fantastic, on the other hand, was the Foreign Office assumption that the Khedive was always plotting treason. My lamented friend, Mr. Benjamin Mosely, who in the years before the War was my most trusted informant on Egyptian matters, was, I believe, the Khedive's not least esteemed mentor. Yet, when the Khedive first sought his counsel, Mosely's first stipulation was for "*une politique conciliatrice envers l'Angleterre*". It was always on that footing that Mosely's counsels were given, and he never found them ignored, or himself trifled with.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

In the considered opinion of Beaman, all the unrest, sedition, and disorder that followed in Egypt was to be traced to the criminal folly of the unjust deposition of the popular sovereign. As to that, readers must now judge for themselves. Those of us who, after the evil episode of the trials at Denshawai in 1906, strove to bring about a moderate progressive policy worthy of the British Control, lived to see the Milner Mission propose measures that far outwent any we had ever contemplated. This is the fatal fashion in which political Conservatism tends to arrest all progress up to the point of explosion. By sheer force of habit, the Foreign Office always ignored the ultimate problem as to Egypt, falling back on hostile formulas. The British people is as responsible as British statesmen for the course things have taken alike in Ireland, in India, and in Egypt.

Sir Eldon Gorst, in his day, was made the victim of the insensate imperialism of his countrymen. Seeking to carry out the instructions given him to stay the Cromerian policy of Anglicizing Egypt on Indian lines, he was virtually mutinied against by the Anglo-Egyptian elements at Cairo, and his life was in all probability shortened by his experience. Lord Kitchener's policy was to return to the Cromerian aims; and hence the subsequent happenings.

The new departure recently made by the British Labour Ministry in our relations with Egypt would

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

have greatly interested Beaman had he lived to see it; and in that case he would certainly have added some pages of comment. I have felt, however, that his book should stand as he left it. To add a discussion on the new situation would be to make the work something else than his.

My object has been to leave the text as he wrote it, save in so far as it has seemed expedient to excise a few pages in which he discussed recent Egyptian palace policy. His exactitude on those matters had been challenged by a qualified Egyptian authority, and in any case the due evidence was lacking. My own slight rectifications of the text have been such as I felt sure Beaman would have approved, as he had done in the case of a previous revision; and my few notes are enclosed in brackets.

J. M. ROBERTSON

# THE DETHRONEMENT OF THE KHEDIVE

## CHAPTER I

NEARLY fifty years ago I used to ride daily on a small and frisky donkey known as "Lily Langtry", from the old Hôtel du Nil, in the Mooskee, to the British Consulate-General, to fulfil my duties as the first Arabic Student Interpreter in the Levant service. There were no cars in those days, nor tramways, and the whole staff of the Agency consisted of Mr. Vivian, his secretary (Mr. Ornstein), the Syrian Interpreter (Mr. Aranghi), and myself. Since 1879 I have frequently lived and stayed in Egypt for various periods, and have always kept up a lively interest in people, events, and everything connected with the country. I have thus been able to follow our relations with the Egyptians in all their stages.

I have borrowed as little as I could from official documents or second-hand authorities, and have relied almost exclusively on my personal knowledge or on first-hand statements and opinions from British and Egyptians of all classes whose acquaintance and friendship I have the pleasure to enjoy. The frequent disapproval, expressed or implied, of different acts and policy will perhaps be adversely commented upon. My only



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

wish is to enable the English reader to enter into the feelings these acts arouse in Egyptian and foreign critics. The admiration I have always felt, and often expressed, for all the great British achievements in Egypt has never prevented me from being equally frank in blaming what is to be blamed. The whole trend of our policy has been, and is, a negation of our professions of 1882, and of our repeated promises to the Egyptians and to the world.<sup>1</sup> This is not the best way to enhance our prestige, or improve our relations with the people whom we profess to wish to render happy and contented. For unless they are completely satisfied there can be small hope of any permanent arrangement between the two peoples such as both really desire.

Perhaps the first condition to be fulfilled is to tell the truth and the whole truth, and no longer to pretend that we intend to give Egypt what we do not intend her to have. This was Cromerism. Since then we have simulated a bestowal of independence which is occupation, in another but no less effective and often an irritating form. No Egyptian believes to-day that England will ever voluntarily evacuate the country, and this being so, the best must be made of a bad job.

<sup>1</sup> [The step taken by the British Government in 1929 is a new departure on which Mr. Beaman would probably have commented with approval had he lived to witness it. What follows was written by him before the General Election.—EDITOR.]

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Up to the British Occupation in 1882, Egypt was comparatively little known to Englishmen. The French were in many ways more familiar with the country and people, and far more at home than we were. It was not until the Suez Canal had been opened, and Ismail Pasha shortly afterwards dethroned by England and France acting conjointly with the other Powers, that English statesmen awoke to the eventual importance of Egypt to England. The replacing of Ismail by Taoufik brought a temporary relief to the population harassed by the exactions of the magnificent Ismail. But Taoufik was a true son of his father without his energy and courage.

He had, however, no lack of the wish to arrogate to himself all the power he could, and before long the Army grew irritated at the constant abuses under which Egyptian officers and men laboured. These were manifold, but the principal were the subordination of Egyptian to Turkish and Circassian officers in every field, rank, and command, and the employment of soldiers in various sorts of Government, and even private, service without pay. Under the leadership of Arâbi Pasha, a fellah-born Colonel, it obtained a first success by the removal of Osman Rifki, an obnoxious Turkish Minister of War. Several mutinous incidents followed without either the English or the French interfering, till the Khedive, with Sir Auckland Colvin, met Arâbi in the Abdin Square. There Arâbi

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

presented an ultimatum demanding the dismissal of the whole Ministry and the convocation of Parliament. This was a distasteful idea for Taoufik, who would rather have faced a dozen rebellious Colonels than a permanent Parliament. He had, however, to yield, and his position was shortly rendered more complicated by the arrival of a Turkish Mission from Constantinople to look into the question of an Army which, in theory, was a part of the Ottoman Forces.

This also irritated Arâbi, as the chief grievance of his party was the undue authority and favour enjoyed by Turks and Circassians. After coquetting for a while with the Turks, the Khedive, in the last resort, declared himself with the Nationalists when they directed their agitation not only against Turks but against all foreign control. Up to the day of the bombardment Taoufik was acting with Arâbi, or rather Arâbi was acting with the consent of the Khedive; but when it came to fighting, instead of withdrawing with the troops to Kafr Dawar, the Khedive preferred to put himself under the protection of the British.<sup>1</sup> The Battle of Tel-el-Kebir ended the rebellion, and Arâbi was sentenced to life exile in Ceylon, together with the three other Colonels and Mahmoud Sami Baroudi, the Minister of War.

England then proclaimed her occupation, which was to last till such time as order should have been restored and Egypt placed in a position to govern her-

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix I.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

self and safeguard the foreign interests existing within her borders. Then the troops would be withdrawn and the country left in its independence. That day has not yet come, though at intervals many declarations have been made of the intention of England to evacuate;<sup>1</sup> and dates have more than once been fixed, up to 1904, when France agreed never again to mention the odious subject of evacuation, which by that time had become a rather bad joke.

Arâbi was the first Nationalist in modern Egypt. I knew him very well, as I did all his fellow-rebels; and when they were all exiled, they named me their *Wakil*, to look after the families they left behind them, and the interests they still possessed in Egypt.<sup>2</sup>

The Nationalism of Arâbi did not strike very deep roots, and, as far as it went, lay dormant for want of

<sup>1</sup> An industrious Frenchman has stated that England has given sixty-three promises to evacuate Egypt since 1882.

<sup>2</sup> The only one who had any property worth speaking of was Mahmoud Sami, whose wife stayed in Cairo to manage his estate. Neither Arâbi nor Abdul 'Aal had a penny, which is a striking testimony to the honesty of men who for nearly a year had had almost absolute control of all the country's resources. Ali Fehmy left a fine house, a small palace in fact, in which his young daughter lived. This was dowry received with his wife, whom he married from Ismail's household. The Government did everything in its power to confiscate this property, but by "squatting" on it and refusing to move, I succeeded at last in getting the title of the wife recognized; and having seen the daughter married off, I leased the place to Sir F. Grenfell, who used it for years as the "*Sirdarieh*".

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

spirit to revive it. Riaz, of course, was ever striving to gain more influence for himself and for Egyptians in the government of the country, but this was not real nationalism: he could never win more than half-hearted support or ineffectual backing from either the Khedive or any considerable body of Egyptians, and he stood no chance of checking the absorbent action of Lord Cromer. This was pursued with sleepless energy and unswerving purpose, and had behind it the unanswerable argument of rifles and ships. It is often said that the Khedive Taoufik was a good and honest friend of England, and a loyal coadjutor to Lord Cromer in his reforms. Whatever he may have been later I cannot say, but as long as I remained in Cairo (up to 1889) he was always struggling, quite naturally, to free himself from British toils, and to act as independently as he could.

Under these circumstances Nationalism was born and, for the time being, buried. The memory of Arâbi was soon almost forgotten, and when after a long exile he was permitted to return to Egypt, his presence was hardly noticed. I saw him, old and feeble, a year or so before he died. He lived in a little house on the very edge of the desert, at Helouan, and I had to ask several people before I could find one to direct me to the home of the former dictator and idolized hero of the masses. He barely recognized me, nor one of his own letters to myself in Arabic, written from Ceylon,

# Dethronement of the Khedive

صديق العزيز المذنبين دام محفوظا  
 بعد اهداءكم تكم مزيد السلام وبث كذبة الاسواق  
 قد حظيت باستلام كتابكم العزيز في ١٥ ابريل ١٨٨٤  
 وصدناه تعالى على محنتكم وصدنا جميع الاغراض طيبة  
 وشكرناكم على حسن سعيكم هذا وارجوكم تفصيل  
 المحبات طيبة الى محله ونحوه لكم صد الشاكرين ونتم  
 بخير يا عزيزي  
 صدقكم  
 احمد عيسى  
 احمد

Ahmad Arabi The  
 Egyptian  
 Colombo

28/5/84

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

and signed in sprawling English characters, "*Ahmad Arabi the Egyptian*". This signature tells the story of his rebellion. He had been the first to feel stirring within his bosom the patriotic spark. It was against Turks, French, Circassians, and English alike that Arâbi protested, and it may be truly said that the Nationalism of to-day has sprung from the seed sown by the simple army Colonel whose proudest title to fame was his self-chosen epithet of "*The Egyptian*". When Egypt gains her real independence, as she should some day, the first statue to be erected in one of the Cairo Squares should be that of Arâbi.

With the advent of Sir Evelyn Baring in the place of Sir E. Malet at the Agency began a new era for Egypt. Sir Evelyn had already served as Commissioner of the Debt in Ismail's time, and came to his post with considerable acquired and valuable knowledge. He set to work at once to cut down expenses and find new sources of revenue, for no reform was possible without funds to carry it out. He knew that his task would not be made easier by the French or other foreigners, who had various strong first liens on all available cash, nor could he look for any cordial assistance from either the Khedive, his Ministers, or the mass of the Egyptians themselves. The tale of his early efforts, of the bitter struggle and the slow but sure success, is told by himself and by many others. It is a great story of dogged perseverance and undaunted belief in the inherent

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

capacity of the country to save itself from ruin if it were properly guided and kept in the right road. But the longer he held the tight rein in his own strong hand the more he grew to love power and the sense of ruling. In his yearly reports he sometimes said that Egypt must "eventually become autonomous, or be incorporated in the British Empire", and that "personally he leaned towards the former alternative", but nothing in his actions would lead to that conclusion.

In the beginning, Lord Cromer had surrounded himself with a few eminent British experts, men like Scott-Moncrieff, Willcocks, Ross, Palmer, and their colleagues, whose hearts and souls were in their jobs. Cromer could rely absolutely on them, and they could equally rely upon him. But as the great edifice of Egyptian reconstruction grew larger and larger, the Chiefs required staffs to relieve them of a portion of their work, and the staffs increased as the areas of their activities spread.

At first it was only in Irrigation, but Inspectors soon were called for in the Finance and Interior, and gradually every Ministry was endowed with its British officials, who, because they were British, had to be obeyed by all Egyptians with whom they had to do, even by their hierarchical superiors. Though an Inspector of Interior had, in theory, no executive power, the Mudir or the Mamour knew better than to fail in carrying out any hint or expression of opinion from the Britisher.



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

And for the first ten or more years Egypt was held up to the world as a model of how an Eastern race and country could and should be governed. From a material point of view the British administration deserved the praise it got. The country had progressed in almost every direction except towards self-government. In this respect the Egyptians found that they were being less governed by any of their compatriots than they had ever been before, and there were no symptoms of any desire or design on the part of England to give them autonomy. Nor were there many outward signs of volcanic elements beneath the surface. But it is an axiom that good government, however good, is never regarded by the governed as the same beatific state as even bad self-determination. England had promised to educate the Egyptians to rule themselves, instead of which she was breaking them in to be ruled by her, and strengthening her own machinery of government. All real controlling posts were given to Englishmen, and an Anglo-Egyptian Civil Service was being established, and regularly recruited from England to take over authority from Ministers and Mudirs down to Egyptians in secondary positions. All these had to take their orders and instructions from Englishmen who, they often felt, knew not half as much about their duties as they did. In this way the belief waxed that England had no idea of evacuating the land or of fitting the Egyptians to govern themselves, and it can scarcely be

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

denied that there was too much ground for some such conviction.

Though at first Lord Cromer may have had a thought and hope of slowly and eventually training up the people to administer their country, I doubt if this lasted long. Education was not only neglected, but systematically kept back; till Egyptians came to fancy that they were purposely prevented not only from having any opportunity of exercising the art of governing in high places, but even from reaching the common standard of lower education in civilized States. Towards the end of his Proconsulship the plan of Cromer was based on the theory that the Egyptians had none of the qualities for self-government, and were never likely to acquire them. It was therefore useless to educate them as they were easier to govern as they were.

Of course, no other Power would ever be allowed to govern in Egypt, so the sooner the Egyptians accustomed themselves to being well ruled by us the better for them. All his closing activities were devoted to assuring the stranglehold he had established on the country by increasing the number of British officials and their authority, and especially by reducing the Khedive and his Ministers to the most complete subjection to his will.

Clever and far-sighted as he had often proved himself to be, Lord Cromer failed entirely to see that the day

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

would inevitably come when the Egyptians would learn enough to assert themselves and claim the rights so often promised to them. It would then be no longer possible to keep up the old fiction, and England would have to decide either to abandon her declared policy or to carry it out to the logical end. England and Egypt are now (1928) in theory in very much the same position as they were in 1882, but in practice we have reached the point where the ways must part. The political growth of Egypt has changed the situation, and a settlement that might have been comparatively simple at several moments in the past under different circumstances may scarcely be so easy to-day, or later still.

Before entering into the personal and public relations between the Khedive Abbas Hilmi and Lord Cromer, it may be suggested that Cromer must have perceived, as he grew older, that all was not by any means well in the land. The lamentable affair of Denshawai, and the rain of questions in the House on this and other regrettable incidents that were happening, showed that his policy was out of date and had failed. The Government at home avoided all fundamental issues at the time, and supported Cromer as stoutly as it could; but Cromer himself knew, when he was driven to resign, that he had sown the wind and that his successors would have to reap the whirlwind. The storm broke much sooner than he apparently anticipated, from the

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

predictions made in his last book, but he saw the first lightnings.

When he said good-bye to the scene of his life's labours in 1906 he was followed by a successor with instructions to reverse the policy he had so patiently built up.<sup>1</sup> But he lived to see its return in a more acute shape under Lord Kitchener and its transformation into a Protectorate—truly a strange ending for a professed experiment in establishing an autonomy. But this was not the end, for the Protectorate has merged into a semblance of Independence which was never more than a mocking shadow of it.

As long as the Khedive Taoufik lived, Lord Cromer had not much difficulty in promoting what came to be known as "Cromerism". There was no organized opposition, and he cared little for the spasmodic efforts of successive Ministers to check the steady increase in the numbers and powers of British officials. There was no national character in the occasional attempts to gain an inch or two of ground by the Khedive or the Premiers, and Cromerism went on its way like a resistless steam-roller. But when Abbas Hilmi came to the throne there was a change.

Before very long Cromer saw that a danger might arise unless the young and self-willed Khedive were

<sup>1</sup> [This applies strictly to the instruction given by Lord (then Sir Edward) Grey to Sir Eldon Gorst, to the effect that posts hitherto held by Egyptians should continue to be filled by Egyptians, and not by Britons.—EDITOR.]

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

subdued into the same sort of obedience as that of his father before him. Almost simultaneously appeared Moustafa Kamel, the exponent of a new school of patriotism. At first Cromer did not altogether discourage the Nationalist movement, thinking that it might be used possibly against the Khedive. But soon Moustafa won the favour of the Khedive, and this was a combination that could not be allowed. It was not, however, the orders of Cromer that led to the break between Abbas Hilmi and Moustafa Kamel, but the too prominent part that the latter seemed to desire to assume in leadership. He was tacitly, if not openly, supported against what Cromer evidently considered as a more serious foe in the person of Abbas Hilmi.

There was no personal antipathy in Cromer's mind towards Abbas, nor in that of the latter towards Cromer. But none the less they came to regard each other as positive enemies rather than representatives of two nations who presumably had common objects and interests. Cromer made no secret of his opinion that the Khedive must be taught to take his orders from the British, and habitually, in his reports home, spoke of the necessity of "giving the Khedive a lesson", in the style of a schoolmaster referring to an unruly pupil. There was never a hint that the act or opinion of Abbas in question was worth a moment's consideration, or that there might possibly be another side to

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

the argument. Abbas Pasha was the rebel who had to be chastised, and all the final years of Cromer's rule were devoted principally to checkmating what he invariably alluded to as the "intrigues" of the Khedive. These intrigues do not seem ever to have aimed at anything more dangerous than securing some small voice in directing the affairs of the country the Khedive was supposed to be ruling, which was not an unnatural object of effort.

When the Khedive sought for support wherever he thought he might find it—from the Turks, from Nationalists, or from his own people—he was taxed with "intriguing". The meaning given in the dictionary for this convenient but vague term is "*a complex plot, a private or party plot. To form a plot or scheme, to puzzle.*" None of the "intrigues" of Abbas Hilmi seem to have been very subtle or earth-shaking, and Lord Cromer appears delightfully unconscious of how carefully he himself was always intriguing to trip up the Khedive and take him at a disadvantage. The most perilous plot mentioned in Cromer's book seems to have been a supposed attempt to undermine the confidence of the Army in its British officers. It was reported that Abbas had made some disparaging remarks concerning the appearance of the troops during a review, and reflections on the British Staff. This was certainly an unwise thing to do; and Kitchener, who was then Sirdar, forthwith resigned, as might have been expected.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Upon which the Khedive at once retracted, and Kitchener reported the incident to Cromer in the following terms:—

The Khedive thereupon became very cordial, and begged me repeatedly to withdraw my resignation. His Highness assured me that he had complete confidence in me, and I gave him to understand that I would not persist in my resignation, though I did not absolutely withdraw it.

It might have been thought that if a man like Kitchener seemed satisfied with the apology offered, the matter might have been left at that—the more so because no great harm had been done, and probably few people in Lower Egypt would ever have heard of the incident. But this was a splendid chance of administering a “lesson”.<sup>1</sup>

So, although Kitchener did not ask for any further

<sup>1</sup> It must be mentioned that a first lesson had been given about a year before, though it had not turned out as well as had been hoped. This was all the more reason for a second one. The first case was when the Khedive had dismissed a Minister whom he had found in office, and whom he disliked for his too ready subservience to the Agency. He named one of his choice, but as he had not consulted Lord Cromer this could not be permitted, and Abbas Hilmi was forced to annul the first nomination and give the Premiership to Riaz Pasha, a nominee of England. It was not long before Cromer was bound to admit that “a mistake had been made in appointing Riaz Prime Minister”. He had already written home: “*The lesson which the Khedive has now received will, I am of opinion, cause His Highness to be very careful of his conduct for the present.*”

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

action, it suited Cromer to seize upon this youthful indiscretion (Abbas Pasha was not yet twenty) to inflict the most grievous humiliation he could devise upon the new Khedive. In his own words (*Abbas II*, p. 53), "the point which struck me was that the opportunity for which I had been waiting had come. It would indeed have been difficult to choose a more favourable battleground." It is clear that Cromer had only waited for, and tried to create, chances to break the spirit and authority of the Khedive, and to prove that the only power that counted in Egypt was represented by his will. Many people thought that this was not the best or the only way to handle the young Prince. But that depends on the object in view. Cromer's aim was to be an autocrat, and it was clear that he would always meet with all the resistance of which the Khedive was capable. Therefore Abbas Hilmi was to be crushed, and Cromer was the man to do the crushing. What he exactly feared from Abbas has never been made clear, but he must have had a deep mistrust, amounting to something like fear, to take the line he adopted.

The book that Lord Cromer published in 1915 bears the look of a justification, *post factum*, of the persecution to which he practically subjected Abbas Hilmi Pasha. There was no call at such a time for such a book, and it is doubtful if ten people in England or Egypt, outside those most closely concerned, cared a



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

jot about the old differences between the Ex-Khedive and the ex-Consul-General. This work will not add anything to the great name of Lord Cromer, and I regret that it seems necessary to touch upon certain passages it contains. In the Preface, speaking of the Khedive, Cromer writes (p. 12) of the "revival of some serious abuses that had been suppressed, such as the shameless traffic in grades and decorations".

The giving of money in return for decorations is an ancient custom dear to the heart of every Oriental, and the objection raised by Cromer opens a rather delicate question. But Abbas Pasha has no special reason to shun its discussion. When I was in Cairo I always heard Abbas Pasha credited with permitting his favourite officials to recommend candidates and pocket the fees.

The contest between Abbas Hilmi and Lord Cromer, however, has not been very fairly reported, and the policy of Lord Cromer had long ceased to aim at educating the Egyptians to govern themselves, in favour of a system of taking over the whole government into his own hands, and crushing all attempt at opposition. When Cromer left there was nothing like a representative Assembly, nor any constitutional responsibility from top to bottom of the Hierarchy. The only actual responsibility was towards England and her officials, who were daily growing more numerous and assertive in what Cromer himself

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

describes as "the flimsy fabric which is called the Egyptian Government".

Abbas Pasha had tried his hardest to stem the tide, but he never had a chance. It is true that there had been a new seed sown by Moustafa Kamel; but Cromer, and perhaps Abbas also, had not estimated the full potentialities of the unfamiliar element he introduced. The Nationalism of the end of the century was a different order of patriotism from that of Arâbi Pasha. It was also "Egyptian", but it aimed firstly at emancipating the masses from the habitual advantages taken of them by the wealthy and official classes. If it could unite the nation to prevent the abuse of privilege by unauthorized Egyptians, it hoped that it could deal later with foreigners like the British. This was the position when Cromer shook the dust from his way-worn feet and left his place to Sir Eldon Gorst.

The new English Representative knew the language, the country, and its people as neither Cromer before him, nor Kitchener after him, ever did. He knew the other Egypt that Cromer did not sense, and that Kitchener did not worry over. He was a man of very liberal mind, as he showed when he was Adviser to the Ministry of Interior. He was at first inclined to help legitimate Nationalism, but the leaders did not appreciate his counsels, and they lost him. His greatest service to the Egyptians was in the institution of the Provincial Councils, which are still a backbone of the

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Administration to-day. They might have been much more useful then if the Moudirs had not abused the use of the Councils in the schools, hospitals, etc.

As the British Government showed later on, England had never really swerved from her determination to keep all virtual control in her own power; and therefore, especially with a Prince like Abbas Hilmi, there was not much use in reversing the policy of Cromer in not very much more than form. Gorst at once ceased the dictatorial habit of his predecessor, and entered into cordial relations with Abbas Hilmi Pasha, and the results were happy and immediate. Things began to go smoothly, and Egyptians were given a little more share in the direction of affairs. But Gorst was aware of the danger to Britain of Nationalism of the Kamel type, and he set himself to break the back of the movement. He soon managed to detach Moustafa Kamel from the Khedive, and then brought a certain section of his followers back to the Palace. The story of Gorst's endeavours to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, which was the almost hopeless problem set to him, has often been told, and as it had no real lasting influence on ulterior political happenings it may be passed over. It showed, however, that it was quite easy to get on with the Khedive, and the reason Gorst did not succeed in obtaining more results before he died was that he had not had time to fight the battle out, and that he was very badly served by the Britishers

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

under him, who were in almost open mutiny against his introduction of Egyptians into superior and responsible positions not under their control—even sometimes threatening to control them. This attitude of passive, when not active, resistance, and the special boycott the Anglo-Egyptians tried to establish against their own Chief, made a disastrous impression both in Cairo and in London, and rendered Gorst's task a heart-breaking one. In the beginning the British officials brought to Egypt were few and far between, and were treated with great consideration and respect by all. But in 1907 they had swelled to an army and formed a sort of Club and colony of their own, which selected Ghezireh as its residence. In his recent book on Egypt Mr. G. Young, speaking of this class, says:

British officials became administrative and not advisory, and [p. 184] a flood of minor officials, mostly young, whose interest in Egypt did not extend beyond the play-grounds of Ghezireh or the gaieties of the great hotels, had little in common with the Egyptians. Even the Egyptian aristocracy did not enjoy the honorary membership, as guests [of the Club], usually extended by Anglo-Indian communities to specially favoured natives. . . . The British Inspector or Engineer of early Cromerism, riding on his donkey, or going through the fields and chatting to the sheikhs and fellaheen, had become an official or officer, hurrying out in a motor and back again in time for his tennis, and seldom setting foot in the country except to shoot quails.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

This picture may be objected to by British officials, but it is certain that there is an increasing tendency to reside as little as possible in the districts. In India it is comparatively rare to see an inspector or magistrate away from his district more than once or twice a year; but I fancy that most of the British provincial officials in Egypt think it rather a bore when they have to attend personally to any business away from their homes in Cairo. If I wrong them I apologize profusely to those who live permanently and continually in their district centres.

## CHAPTER II

GORST had given the Khedive a little respite, and he had split up the Nationalists, and disintegrated their party; but the advent of Kitchener in 1911 led to an aggravation of the policy of Cromer—the policy of extinguishing the Egyptian elements in all administrations and increasing the British in numbers and power. Whilst giving Englishmen more authority and prestige, Kitchener reserved all important initiative and ultimate decisions for himself, and the British staff was in almost as close dependence as the Egyptians on his personal whim or guidance.

It was a new experiment to appoint as our Representative a former official of the Egyptian Government such as Lord Kitchener, who had so long held the post of Sirdar of the Army.<sup>1</sup>

When “K”, as he was always called in Egypt, arrived in a battleship, Abbas Hilmi Pasha was still in residence at his Palace of Montâza in Alexandria, but

<sup>1</sup> By a strange irony Kitchener, who is generally credited with being mainly if not wholly responsible for the dethronement of the Khedive, owed his appointment as Sirdar to Abbas Hilmi Pasha. There were several candidates with apparently better claims and backing, but Abbas Hilmi wrote privately to Queen Victoria, saying what pleasure it would give him to see Kitchener named. Her Majesty replied immediately and personally that she had taken the necessary steps, and that the nomination would appear in the next *Gazette*.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Kitchener did not pay him the courtesy of a visit, but ordered a special train for himself and departed straight to Cairo. It was some little time before there was any open declaration of hostilities between the two only forces that counted in Egypt.

Very different estimates have been formed of the character and capacities of Lord Kitchener. He was, I think, generally regarded as a severe, straightforward soldier, who would always take the shortest and quickest cut to reach his goal. The Egyptians, who had only known him at a distance as Sirdar, soon came to regard him with mingled awe and admiration. Since the days of Ismail they had not been governed frankly by one man's will. "K" was an imposing figure who inspired obedience with a god-like disregard for opposition. Lord Cromer had managed Egypt, but always under the mask of Egyptians; and Taoufik scarcely made a pretence of ruling, under orders from Cromer. Abbas Hilmi Pasha had shown the nature and strength of a ruler, and, if allowed, would certainly have soon had the country under his command. But he had never been given any scope, being kept on a string by Cromer, and even Gorst, though the latter tie was a silken one compared to the clanking fetters of "The Lord".<sup>1</sup> Unlike Gorst, his successor made no pretence

<sup>1</sup> [This was one of several unseemly titles accorded to Cromer by his own officials. "Pharaoh" was another.—EDITOR.]

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

of paying attention to the feelings or ideas of those he had to deal with. Whatever he wanted had to be done at once, not because it was very necessary, but because it was an order of Kitchener. Most Orientals are ready to bow to a decisive order, and will do so even if they hate it; and look up with reverence to, and give ready obedience to, any real master. The only exception in Cairo was soon the Khedive, and the undisguised scorn with which Kitchener rather ostensibly treated him only increased the fear of the people for a foreigner who cared so little for the Effendina, grandson of the great Ismail. But neither Abbas Pasha nor his Ministers counted with the tyrannic soldier, whose position and prestige waxed apace. He was indeed not only dreaded but rather liked by the masses, to whom his eccentricities often appealed, and who enjoyed seeing their great men being put into the same category as themselves. If the War had not intervened it is impossible to say what "K" might not have done with Egypt, but it is idle to indulge in speculations.

His mind was a most rare and complex one. He sometimes had an almost uncanny clearness of vision and an exact certainty of what he wanted and could get, but this was often accompanied by a tortuous conception of how to get it. He seldom if ever took the shortest road to his goal if he could find another, and appeared to create difficulties for the pure joy of



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

overcoming them by some devious method, when he could have had all he wanted for the asking. Many of those who worked in Egypt, and later in England, with Kitchener will remember how hard it was at times for them to arrive at the simplest results.

At the beginning of the War, by forming the Kitchener Army, he rendered priceless service for which his name will surely live; but before his tragic end it had come to be not easy to collaborate with him, and he was too often known in the Service as "Kitchener of Chaos". He was never a brilliant commander, or capable of handling big forces in the field, having perhaps a tendency to lose sight of the forest for the trees. But he had a prodigious driving power and grasp of detail, with a genius for picking his subordinates. In his book (p. 194) Mr. Young writes: "His mind had shaped itself into a baffling blend of despotic decision and diplomatic duplicity peculiar to Oriental Princes, and like them he was a *poseur*." I should rather say that he was too obstinate and self-centred ever to achieve success as a diplomat, as he cared not a straw for the interests of others, and was incapable of grasping any other point of view than his own or of seeing the other side. If anybody differed from his ideas or objected to his pet plans of the moment, whether it were the Khedive, his Ministers, his British officials, or any other individual, body, or class,

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Kitchener brushed them impatiently aside, as if they were mosquitoes.

As long as he did not come into immediate conflict with Abbas Hilmi Pasha, Kitchener treated him merely as a quantity that might have importance later on, but as the years progressed he saw that many of his schemes were failing to gain approbation; and though there were plenty of inherent reasons for this, Kitchener chose to attribute it to Abbas or his *entourage*. Unlike Lord Cromer, Kitchener rarely if ever admitted that he could be wrong, and sought somebody to blame when something went awry. And Abbas Pasha was practically the only one large enough to fix the fault upon. In this way it gradually came to be generally believed that several of Kitchener's most cherished schemes were blocked by Abbas, though it is by no means easy to see how the Khedive could have done so, or where the "sinister influence" which is so persistently attributed to him<sup>1</sup> interfered with Kitchener's dreams.

Several of Kitchener's favourite projects were wrecked by the very classes he hoped to benefit. One looks in vain for any definite offensive on the part of Abbas Hilmi, and he seems only to have persisted in the not unnatural desire to have some share in the government of his country. One concrete offence is always charged against him, however, which may

<sup>1</sup> *Egyptian Problem*, V. Chirol, p. 119.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

show how rashly and indeed maliciously the Khedive was libelled. I will give the quotation from Sir V. Chirol, p. 115. I cite him only as being a popularly accepted authority on Egyptian affairs, but the same tale is to be found in all recent works, and in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, which also states in its last edition that Abbas died in Vienna in 1923.<sup>1</sup>

Lord Kitchener continued to treat the intrigues (?) of the Khedive and his creatures with a somewhat contemptuous indifference so long as any vital interest or the particular spheres of Egyptian administration in which he himself took a special interest were not seriously affected. When they were, as for instance when he discovered that the Khedive proposed to sell the Mariut Railway, constructed mainly for the development of one of his own estates, to the Banco di Roma, acting, it was believed, on German account, he did not hesitate to put his foot down very heavily.

It would be difficult to misrepresent an incident more speciously. Anybody reading the foregoing would imagine that the Khedive was secretly negotiating the sale of a line of strategic importance to Egypt and England, and that Kitchener had suddenly discovered this and had acted very severely towards the Khedive in consequence.

Here are the real facts. About fifteen months before,

<sup>1</sup> This has been brought to notice, but no correction of the absurd mistake has been made.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Kitchener was buying up several small, principally British-owned railways in Upper Egypt at very remunerative rates for the sellers. The Khedive at that time, more than a year previously, had offered to sell the Mariut line to Kitchener for somewhat less than half the price per mile than had been paid in the south. But Kitchener had not even seen fit to reply. He probably thought that, if he waited, he would later have a chance of getting Abbas's railway, if not for nothing, at least at some cheaper rate. This would appeal to Kitchener's mind as a smart and clever piece of diplomacy. Finally the Banco di Roma began to open negotiations, and "K" at once made this a pretext for accusing Abbas Hilmi of deep designs against the British. Nobody knew better than Kitchener that no military threat to England could ever be involved, even if the Italians or Germans came to own an isolated strip of railway in the middle of Lower Egypt. The day war was declared all railways would, of course, be at once placed under British control, as happened later on. The result of this ingenious little plot was, however, very different from what Kitchener had expected.

A well-known M.P. obtained from Cairo, from an unimpeachable source, information that the railway had been on offer to Kitchener for more than twelve months, and was still on offer on the same terms. It was very unlikely in any case that it would ever be sold

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

to Italy, and it was plain that the easiest way to prevent even this eventuality would be to buy it for Egypt.

This side of the case was very strongly put by the M.P. mentioned to Sir Edward Grey, who on the same day telegraphed curtly to Kitchener to buy the line immediately. This was not at all what Kitchener wanted, but he had to obey, and he long bore a quite undeserved grudge against the Khedive for the action of Sir Edward Grey. Far from having put his foot down himself, Kitchener was ordered by the Foreign Office to do at once what he could have done at first, and the foot was rather put upon him. It is strange that this incident should be invariably related as an example of the duplicity of Abbas Pasha, and of Kitchener's vigilance and defeat of Abbas's dark designs.

One of the duels that occurred is worth relating. It was *à propos* of the Wakfs. One day Kitchener called at the Palace, and, on being introduced, drew a paper from his pocket and, avoiding the eyes of Abbas and apparently in a state of great nervousness, read out: "I am instructed by my Government to state that, owing to the prevalent and continuing abuses perpetrated in connection with Wakfs (religious foundations), it is of opinion that they should be placed under a separate Ministry, and under British control or supervision." He wished to ask His Highness to take immediate measures to carry out this change. He would give him

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

a week to reply. The Khedive, however, answered at once that in all matters referring to Egypt alone he would always do his best to oblige Kitchener, but this was a matter that concerned the Khalifate, and he could not take it upon himself to change any religious system without the consent of the Sultan. At the same time he begged to be allowed to read the dispatch from which Kitchener was ostensibly quoting. The latter, however, refused, saying that it was a mere paraphrase or note of his, and that he would call again in a week. The Khedive could only repeat that he could give no other answer until he had heard from Turkey, and the interview ended abruptly with Kitchener stalking out of the room.

As soon as he was gone Abbas Pasha called his Ministers, Mohamed Said and Rushdi Pasha, told them what had happened and ordered them to go forthwith to the Residency and repeat his answer. On being received, "K" told them that he had already wired to the F.O. the acceptance of the Khedive, who had asked for eight days to effect the change. When the Ministers brought back this message Abbas Hilmi at once sent for Sirry Pasha, the Director of Railways, and in presence of the others instructed him to have a special train ready next morning to convey him to Alexandria. He also gave orders to have all his personal effects packed, as he did not intend returning to Cairo. Thereupon he sent his Ministers again to the Resi-

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

dency to inform Kitchener of what they had seen and heard. When they related to Kitchener what was going on at Abdin Palace, they reported he turned first pale and then scarlet, and muttered that there had been some mistake. He had not yet telegraphed to London, and he asked the Khedive to wire to Constantinople, saying he would wait for the reply. In a few days the Grand Vizier telegraphed that "seeing the good results obtained by English control in other Ministries, there was no objection to the proposal". The truth was that Kitchener had already assured himself of the consent of Turkey, which at that time was relying almost entirely and in desperation on England to save the Sultan from the Young Turks. Furthermore, Kitchener was supposed to have an understanding with Said Halim, the Grand Vizier, and a relation of the Khedivial family, that if ever the throne of Egypt became vacant it should be given to him. Kitchener was therefore sure of meeting with no objection in Constantinople. If Kitchener had frankly told Abbas all this, there would never have been cause for any incident. On receiving the reply from Turkey, Abbas at once sent a copy of it to the Residency, with a Note stating his readiness to comply with the request of Kitchener, and the matter ended as Kitchener had asked. The incident is given to illustrate the roundabout ways affected by "K" in preference to plain methods.

Kitchener's short tenure of office was marked by

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

many eccentricities, but as a rule there was a good deal of sense in what appeared his maddest proceedings. His legislation was voluminous, and he never hesitated in carrying out an idea that recommended itself to his imaginative brain. His "Five Feddan Law" was entirely the creature of his private conception, and it did a great service to the millions of the fellaheen who were in danger of having all their small holdings taken from them by usurers, or wealthy neighbours. Kitchener was also responsible for beautifying Cairo very considerably, and ordered the spending of large sums of Government money as if it were his own, though it might be, and often was, much more needed elsewhere. A suggestion from "K", however, was an order, and even when he thought he would like to bring two columns down from a temple at Luxor to place them as decorations for the approach to the Cairo Railway Station, at a cost of twenty thousand pounds, it was impossible to oppose him. Luckily some other scheme diverted his attention from this folly and it never saw fruition, though through no fault or return of sense on the part of Kitchener.

In his frequent provincial tours he distributed Crown lands without any other reason than a passing fancy for some peasant, and behaved much more like an autocratic despot than the Khedive. It is a question whether he did more harm than good to Egypt, but he was certainly immensely popular in the provinces.



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

He got credit for the rout of the Nationalist Party, and also by passing Draconian laws against brigandage and the Press. Any objectionable politician was brought indiscriminately under one or other of these "Decree Laws", and put away for the time being. It was the opinion in Egypt though that the Nationalists had been rendered harmless already by the diplomacy of Gorst, and that Kitchener was only beating an almost dead horse. All he did was to drive some of them to the fold of the Khedive, who himself was not particularly in want of them. Before he left Egypt, Kitchener had rather consolidated the Nationalists, and exasperated most of the *intelligentsia*, as may be gathered from the open letter published by Ismail Pasha Abâza, a universally respected member of the Assembly.<sup>1</sup>

Ismail Pasha wrote :

I take the British Agent to task for the Press Laws, which mean a reaction to thirty years ago, for treating journalists as brigands, and for attacking the authority of the Legislative Council.

We are progressing in brutality, loquacity, drink, and debts. In 1884 we imported flour to the value of £134,000,

---

<sup>1</sup> Ismail Abâza was a great friend of mine, and a man of dauntless courage and unblemished rectitude. He has often been called the father of Constitutionalism, and did much to teach and foster the love of political liberty in Egypt. [I am glad to add here my own tribute to the sagacity of Abâza Pasha.—EDITOR.]

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

in 1909 of £1,836,000. Under Mohamed Ali we sent 905 students to Europe, under Ismail 155, and under Abbas we send 43. What is the remedy? Self-government—and for the last thirty years we have not moved an inch towards self-government.

This was all true, but it had no more effect on Kitchener than the wind from the Mokattam Hills. He went his stately way, heedless of all opinion, and having no other foeman worthy of his steel, "K" had certainly resolved to dethrone the Khedive, or otherwise get rid of him, and thus of all relics of opposition, as soon as he could.

Abbas was accused of first favouring Moustafa Kamel and then Zaghloul; and whatever the Ministers or the Legislative Assembly did that displeased Kitchener, it was always Abbas Hilmi Pasha who was held responsible. Yet it was already evident that there was a spreading discontent amongst the better educated and thinking classes at the systematic exclusion of Egyptians from all share in authority. One of the excuses for this was that Abbas was showing, and the Legislative Assembly was proving, how unfit one and the other were for ruling. But as they had never been allowed to practise administrative authority and responsibility they were not likely to admit this. Be that as it may, Kitchener, in effect, took over Egypt as if it were a governed province; and he was probably visualizing in his far-seeing gaze a great British

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

African Empire to stretch from Alexandria to Capetown, with Egypt as the Northern Gate. The declaration of war, however, put an abrupt end to dreams, and England and Egypt were faced with tough realities. When peace came elsewhere we found that it had not come to Cairo, and it was then realized that all the spade-work of Cromer, Gorst, and Kitchener had not advanced the situation very materially from that which we found, politically, when Wolseley marched in from Tel-el-Kebir.

In reviewing the reign of Kitchener—for it was the reign of a King rather than the mission of a Diplomatic Agent—it can scarcely be truthfully said that he contributed anything towards permanent administrative, political, or social progress, save one. Everything he did, or half-did, has required undoing except, perhaps, the Five Feddan Law, for which the fellaheen still rise up and call him blessed. Whether he was solely responsible for the removal of the last Khedive, or whether Lord Cromer also had a share in that measure, Kitchener does not seem to have taken any active steps in that direction before departing from Egypt. The Egyptian Army was the real monument he left behind him, but his triumphs at Dongola and Omdurman were gained rather by his genius for organization than by tactics and strategy, for which his Brigadiers—Hunter, Maxwell, Lewis, and Macdonald—were immediately responsible.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

In some respects Kitchener often reminded me of Charles Gordon. They were both strong silent souls, who delighted not in the company of their fellow men, and had the same solitary, stubborn, self-reliant pride of spirit. "K" was, I believe, more at home and happier when surrounded by and dealing with Africans than with his fellow-countrymen, and it was not often that he trusted or confided fully in any but himself.<sup>1</sup>

It was the Soudan that made Kitchener and killed Gordon, and it will be with that wild land that their names will always be linked in history. Gordon was, however, more human and passionate than the latter-day soldier, and he had a mystic side to his character, and a moral complex that you would look for in vain

<sup>1</sup> I first knew Kitchener when he was attached to Colonel Taylor of the Hussars, who was organizing the new Egyptian Cavalry in 1883. He was then merely a junior Captain, and only known to a few for his research work in Palestine. He was out of place as an instructor of recruits in riding and, as a matter of fact, he was always a wretched horseman. His efforts as a riding master were the subject of much ribald joking from his fellow cavalry officers, but he carried on with dogged patience until he secured a remove. I did not see much more of him till the Dongola Expedition, when he was already looked upon as a coming man and sure to make his name. During those dreary desert months all the War Correspondents got to know the Sirdar very well—perhaps too well, as he hated all of them with a pious hate, and struck the first nail into the coffin of the old and festive amateur military expert, as most of them were. Men like Bennett Burleigh and Melton Prior, to mention only two, had seen twice the service of any officer in the British Army, and knew a good deal more about fighting than most.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

with "K". There is a common belief that Kitchener was a good Arabic scholar, and that this had a good deal to do with his success with the fellaheen. He may have been acquainted with some literary Arabic, but he certainly was rarely heard to say a word except the ordinary orders to servants and grooms. I have often been told that when he did attempt to express himself in the vernacular nobody could ever understand him.

He took no farewell of Egypt in 1914, fully expecting to return after a short holiday and continue enjoying the exercise of full authority as before. Everything seemed in good working order, and both at the Residency and Head Quarters he left two of the best and most experienced Englishmen that could have been found.

As far as his activities went, and as far as he had to do with the Khedive officially, the scene was shifted for each of them from Egypt to Europe. There is, therefore, no need to mention Kitchener any more, and we shall now have to follow as closely as it can be done the vicissitudes that befel Abbas Hilmi Pasha after he quitted Alexandria to take his regular annual cure at some European Spa.

### CHAPTER III

WE pick up Abbas Pasha again at Paris in July, 1914. It was his custom every year to take the waters in Europe after visiting Paris, and then, at the end of his cure, to meet his royal mother, the Princess Emineh, at Constantinople, and spend a month or so with Her Highness at Bebek on the Bosphorus. He used to travel to Paris by rail, and the Queen Mother and her suite used the royal yacht *Mahroussah*, the expenses being paid by the Khedive out of his own pocket, and not charged upon the Government as all similar disbursements have since been.

At that time Abbas Hilmi was still on fairly good terms with the Sultan, although several warnings had been received by him in Cairo that attempts were going to be made upon his life. He had never paid much attention to similar stories in Egypt, and even though he was aware that Prince Said Halim, the Grand Vizier, coveted his Egyptian vineyard, this did not prevent him from carrying out his programme. He had intended to leave Paris early in July, but was officially invited by the President to be present at the fêtes on the 14th; and this delayed him so that he did not reach Constantinople till about the 23rd, which also was the first day of two Turkish national fêtes. As no newspapers appeared on those two days, the arrival of Abbas Pasha was, and could have been,

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

known only to a few high officials and his own people. After greeting his mother he prepared on the third day to pay his courtesy call on the Grand Vizier at the Sublime Porte. Though he had not asked for it and was not yet announced to have arrived, a special carriage was sent for him with an escort riding beside and behind in other carriages.

Just as his open landau was about to turn into the gateway giving entrance to the Grand Vizierate, a man sprang forward and fired four shots point blank at the Khedive. The first shot took him in the cheek, and the other three lodged in the shoulder and arm that Abbas instinctively raised. Ramzi Bey tried to jump out, but was held back by the officer in the carriage, whilst another leaped down and shot the assailant with his revolver. This extinguished all hope of ever learning on what grounds or at whose instigation the assassin had acted.<sup>1</sup>

In this case no serious inquiry was held, and nothing was ever found out concerning this cowardly crime. Public opinion at the time, and ever since, has held that it was committed with an idea of leaving the throne vacant for a Turkish candidate; but no clue was ever found, or official information vouchsafed.

<sup>1</sup> It is a habit that has long been followed in Turkey and some other Balkan countries to do away with all possibility of unpleasant revelations after a political *attentat* by silencing the executioner. Dead men tell no tales, and it is not often that the guilty is brought to justice, as he is either safely smuggled away or killed out of hand.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

This shooting occurred in the last days of July, a week or so before the War broke out. There had been no inkling of what was brewing either in Paris or Constantinople, and though there was already great anxiety, it was then only a thundercloud that lowered.

The Khedive was very seriously wounded, and for a week or two his life was despaired of. The news created the greatest consternation in Egypt, and the telegraph was incessantly burdened with requests for information and expressions of indignation. As soon as it could be hired, a large steamer was freighted by private individuals and left Alexandria to visit the Khedive, though he was not well enough to receive visitors for several weeks. He was not allowed to leave his room through August, but as his convalescence progressed and all danger was pronounced to be at an end, Abbas began to prepare for a return to Cairo, where he felt that his presence was, and would be, urgently needed. The War had begun in earnest, and as he had no great faith in the courage and energy of Rushdi Pasha, whom he had left as Regent, he was particularly anxious because of the sparseness and insufficiency of the information sent by Rushdi, and his failure either to come himself or to send a confidential emissary to his sovereign as he was ordered to do.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The whole behaviour of Rushdi during the first three months of the War was the subject of a heated newspaper correspondence last spring (1927) in Cairo. Several notable Pashas who were in Constantinople on the spot in 1914



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

It can easily be understood that it was not a moment for a ruler in the position of Abbas Hilmi Pasha to remain abroad and leave a free field to intrigue in Egypt, although Mr. Beaumont, Acting Ambassador at Constantinople, had sent to assure Abbas that everything was perfectly quiet, and that there was no need for him to hurry back until he was in his ordinary health, and at his own convenience.

Probably the Khedive was more indignant than surprised when, on September 27th, he was informed that Sir Lewis Mallett, the British Ambassador, who had just returned, wished to see him. As Abbas Pasha was not fit to pay visits, Sir Lewis Mallett, accompanied by Mr. Ryan as First Dragoman, came to the Bebek Palace. He lost no time in polite inquiries or in beating about the bush, but very shortly stated that the British Government did not wish Abbas Hilmi to remain on the Bosphorus, but were taking a suitable villa for His Highness at Naples (whither Ismail his grandfather had been exiled!), and expected him to move there as quickly as his state of health permitted.

Abbas Pasha replied that he did not require any other authority to take residences for him, as he pre-

contributed their *quota*, and the general conclusion came to—as far as any was arrived at—was that Rushdi had fallen very far short of his duties, and that if he had acted otherwise it would probably have been feasible to find another solution than the deposition of Abbas and the proclamation of the Protectorate (*Private letter from Cairo*).

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

ferred to choose them himself, and as regards Naples, he had no idea or intention of residing there. In fact he hoped in a few weeks to regain Egypt, where the people were clamouring for his return. It must be borne in mind that Abbas Pasha was still in the eyes of the world the reigning Khedive.

*"You will never go back to Egypt again,"* was the curt reply. The date therefore on which Abbas Pasha was exiled and deposed through the mouth of the British Ambassador was on or about September 27, 1914. This is beyond dispute.

On hearing this stunning announcement, Abbas still retained his presence of mind, even when Sir L. Mallett repeated that he must go to Italy without delay. He replied by a request to be alternatively allowed to go to Switzerland, as he would never live in Italy. This request was also brusquely declined, and Sir L. Mallett declared that Italy alone would be acceptable.

If he were neither to be permitted to stay in Constantinople, to return to Egypt, nor to reside in Switzerland, there were few refuges left to the Khedive outside Germany and Austria. Abbas did not deem it consonant with his dignity to attempt any argument or remonstrance, which would clearly have been useless, and as he was quite determined never to go to Italy, and being for the moment ill, he resolved to merely stay where he was. No further effort seems to have been

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

made to force the Italian scheme upon him, and on November 5th Turkey entered into the war. Having no wish to be entangled in complications with any belligerent Power, Abbas Hilmi Pasha made his preparations to remove to Switzerland as the best neutral residence for him. On December 12th he took refuge at Berne and Geneva, where he stayed till 1917.

The foregoing is the plainest recital possible of facts connected with the deposition of the Ex-Khedive. Yet with one consent every author who has written on the dethronement, exile, and subsequent spoliation of Abbas Hilmi, has adopted a version which appears to have been taken from the Proclamation of December, 1914, that stated that Abbas Hilmi was deposed "for adhering to the enemy".

Taking the work of Sir Valentine Chirol (*The Egyptian Problem*, 1920) as more or less a standard work of reference, we read (p. 124): "By simply deposing the Khedive, *who had deserted his country*"—this after the assertion (p. 119) that "Abbas made an end of himself as Khedive by throwing off the mask he had so long and too successfully worn, and *siding openly with our enemies when the War broke out*".

I quote Sir Valentine as being one of the earliest writers after the peace, and also because he is generally considered as a sound authority on Eastern policy and politics. Subsequent authors have all followed Chirol's errors.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

We have the visit of the acting Head of the Constantinople Embassy in August assuring the Khedive there was no need for his return till he was entirely recovered from his wounds, to whom Abbas replied that he hoped to be back shortly. Within a month the British Ambassador informed Abbas Pasha that he would never be allowed to set foot in Egypt again, nor to reside in Switzerland.

The Khedive was thus deposed and exiled before the end of September, when he had spent about six weeks on a sick-bed, and could hardly have "adhered to the enemy" as he was accused of doing in December. By what argument Abbas Hilmi Pasha can be alleged to have "sided openly with the enemy" when he was seriously ill in Turkey, which was not then a belligerent Power, is yet to be divulged. Even when Turkey came into the War, Abbas Hilmi made haste to depart, and was not in Turkey but in neutral Switzerland when he was officially dethroned for "adhering to the enemy".

No explanation beyond the mythical "adherence" has ever been given of this more than arbitrary measure. It was, and still is I think, generally attributed to advice given by Kitchener, but no details have ever leaked out. Others fancy that Cromer was the counsellor that influenced the Government.

But I have never been able to discover proof of any specific accusation or allegation having been made

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

against Abbas by either Cromer or Kitchener—or indeed by anybody else in authority—so that we can only wait for the production of evidence that Abbas “adhered to the enemy” in 1914. There is little doubt that both the big autocrats of Cairo profoundly mis-trusted Abbas Pasha, almost to the exaggeration of fearing him; but whether they ever carried their prejudices to the point of insisting on his removal, or gave sufficient grounds to the British Government for the step, has never been told. If one or both of the ex-Consuls-General did advise the expulsion of Abbas, it is another proof of how little they knew him and Egypt.

The only thinkable ground for getting rid of him in a war would be a fear that he should in some way or other assist the enemy or thwart our aims. Very many people, even those who were most friendly with the Khedive, were not always ready to agree with him or his opinions, but few indeed ever thought him a fool. Abbas Hilmi knew as well as, if not better than, anybody that Egypt needed a protector, and he had seen and read too much of the methods of Germany ever to dream of exchanging the rough but paternal ægis of England for the slave-driving methods of the Teutons.

The point, however, is scarcely worth arguing about. The fact is that unless some very secret facts are known to the British Government alone, the Khedive had not, and could not have, adhered to the enemy

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

when he was deposed *de facto* in September, and *de jure* in December. Much less did he ever desert his country, to which he was forcibly prevented from returning in September, 1914.

The justice of the measure is therefore very questionable, and the wisdom of it even more so. During his reign Abbas had won himself a great position in the Near East, and was especially looked up to with respect and affection by most of the great Arab Emirs such as Ibn Saoûd, the Emir Yehia, the Sheikh of Mohammera, and the heads of the Roalla and other Asiatic roaming Bedouin tribes. His advice and influence would have given us for next to nothing much more valuable assistance than we gained by paying millions in gold.

In Egypt itself he was respected by the Ulema, as it was owing to his precept and example that El Azhar regained more than its early prestige and wealth. Abbas Pasha found the great Moslem University in a state of abject poverty, with barely a few hundred students and professors. By endowing it himself, and exhorting others to do so, and by every kind of encouragement, he restored to the Azhar all its old glories. Some writers have said that Abbas was disliked by the masses. But it was chiefly the malcontents and the unruly that feared and hated him. The check he gave to the extreme Nationalists made him a party of enemies for a while, but the hostility

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

of the British finally almost sanctified him a martyr. It is beyond question that could he return to the throne the whole of Egypt would be alight with bonfires from Alexandria to Khartoum to welcome him. He is the only Khedive since Ismail who ever made even a show of governing Egypt, and the Egyptians would be as easy for him to manage as they have proved difficult for ourselves and our nominees.

As the deposition of Abbas Hilmi is one of the points that the writer has had principally in view in publishing this book, the reader is asked to go over carefully the following facts:

(1) The Khedive Abbas was officially deposed by Proclamation dated December 19, 1914 (note the exact date), for "adhering to the enemy". On December 28th another Proclamation by Sir J. Maxwell placed a "sequester" on all the property of the Khedive "in order to protect the interest of His Highness and his creditors".

(2) But Abbas had been deposed on September 27, 1914, by Sir Lewis Mallett, who refused to permit him ever to return to Egypt, or to reside in Switzerland.

(3) At that date Abbas was not recovered from the four bullet wounds received by him on July 24th.

(4) At the end of August Mr. Beaumont, in charge of the Constantinople Embassy in the absence of Sir L. Mallett, called on the Khedive and informed him that all was quiet in Egypt, and for the sake of his

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

health he would do well to remain at Constantinople until his complete recovery.

(5) In less than a month the Ambassador, Sir L. Mallett, who had returned, expressed the opinion that Abbas should have left Constantinople earlier, and must now make haste to go to Naples, as he would "never again be allowed to see Egypt". What happened between the events (4) and (5)?

(6) It has never been publicly, or (as far as diligent search can reveal) privately, stated that from July 24th, when he was dangerously wounded, to September 27th, when he was deposed by Sir L. Mallett for "adhering to the enemy", Abbas had had any dealings of any sort or kind with Germany or Austria, which were then the only enemies in the War.

(7) It is repeatedly brought against Abbas Pasha as a crime that he "deserted his country", when it is abundantly evident that both by guile and by force it was England and England alone (except for his wounds) that first kept him in Constantinople and then prevented him from returning.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> He is even somewhat drolly blamed for not having done anything to alleviate the sufferings of the British prisoners from Kut as a friend of the British, and in the same breath reproached for not having encouraged the Turkish armies in Palestine to annihilate their foes (Colonel Elgood, *The Egyptian Army*, p. 98). The writer does not seem aware of what happened in Constantinople in 1914, or that Abbas left before the end of the year and did not return till several years later.



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

(8) A great many people still appear to believe that Abbas Pasha was at Constantinople during a great part of the War, and that this in a measure justified his being looked upon as an enemy. When he went to Constantinople to pass the Feast of Bairam there, as was his wont, Turkey was not at war. As has been said above, he quitted Turkey within twenty days or so of the Turks joining in, and, beyond some perhaps natural sympathy with the Turkish Moslems—he being himself a Turk and a Moslem—no one has heard of any act of his tending to assist the Turks against us, or lending itself to the interpretation of adhering to the enemy.

I cannot deny the possible existence of such action, but it has not been published, and my object is to learn more about this affair.

The reader is asked to recapitulate the preceding few statements of uncontradicted facts, and to reflect upon the incongruous conduct of the British Government towards Abbas Hilmi in so far as he is accused of deserting his country when he was using every effort to return there and was only prevented by England. Secondly, in that he was deposed for adhering to the enemy when, as a matter of fact, he had done nothing of the kind; though no effort appears to have been spared to force him into hostile camps. Why? As an excuse to get him out of the way? If there were reasons for cutting off Abbas from all opportunities of secretly

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

abetting the King's enemies, why was he not allowed, or even forced, to go to England, where his every movement could have been controlled most minutely? He has never been granted leave since to visit England, where he must still have numerous friends. The deepest mystery surrounds the whole of this strange proceeding.

The only accusation I have ever been able to collect as justifying the deposition and subsequent stripping of Abbas is that he was a desperate "intriguer". The field of intrigue is without limit, and the use of the word is worthless as against a man's character and aims unless it can be qualified with dangerous or evil designs. If Abbas was disliked by Cromer and Kitchener as an "intriguer", it was probably because they themselves were not above indulging in their own little intrigues, and when they came into contact with Abbas Pasha they were apt to come off second best at a game in which Orientals are usually superior to Europeans. They would then resort to the argument *ad hominem*, and pour out wrath and contempt on the "intrigue" which they had quashed with a club after being worsted with a foil. "Intrigue" was always a favourite word with both Cromer and Kitchener, but it is a too unsatisfactory and flabby one for a historian to use seriously without chapter and verse.

It might be thought—and most people probably would think—that sufficient importance was not

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

attached at the end of 1914 to what was going on, or might go on, in Egypt. The horrid flurry of the battle-fields in Europe left little time to bother about Egypt, where at least everything seemed tolerably quiet and safe. What has happened since in the matter of Abbas Hilmi would seem to indicate that some hidden hand had formed an elaborate scheme to punish the Ex-Khedive for some unknown or imaginary crime. As the story is unfolded, it will appear (rightly or wrongly) as if no stone was left unturned to stamp out even the very name of Abbas Hilmi from the living. The problem is a very interesting one, and if the recounting of the known facts ever leads to a revelation of the secret motives behind them, a strange narrative may develop.

We have now come to the stage where Abbas has gone to Switzerland, with all his property placed by the Military under "sequester" in order officially, and possibly really in the original idea of Sir J. Maxwell, "to protect the interests of the owner and of creditors". In fact, as long as Sir J. Maxwell was in command nothing extraordinary occurred to the property. At Cairo, Sultan Hussein, the uncle of Abbas, had been put upon the throne with the new title. He was an honourable gentleman, but of no very strong intellectual capacity. He often said that he was only keeping the throne for Abbas, and he would never allow the name of the Ex-Khedive to be spoken ill of. In fact,

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

he dismissed one of his high Palace officials for mere disparaging remarks anent Abbas Pasha.

Whilst the tide of war swept to and fro in Europe it left Egypt in an eddy, one of the few places where life flowed on at first without grave anxieties or troublesome restrictions. From 1914 to 1918 people lived fast and died fast; for, as the French say, "*les morts vont vite*," and those who were out of sight were soon out of mind. Except for a few relentless adversaries, the fate of Abbas Hilmi had ceased to interest anybody in Egypt until King Fuad came to the throne, haunted with an ever-present dread of the return of his nephew Abbas.

Practically a clean sweep had been made of the whole Residency staff, and except Sir Milne Cheetham there were few, if any, who personally knew and remembered the Ex-Khedive.

When Sultan Hussein died, his natural heir and successor was Prince Kemal Eddin, his son. But the Prince had no ambition to take the place of his brother-in-law Abbas, whom he still considered, in common with most of the family, as his rightful sovereign. Neither was he attracted by the prospect of being a dummy king under the orders of succeeding British Generals or Ministers, and he declined.

As the military did not wish an *interregnum*, the throne was offered to Fuad, who was the next son of Ismail—thus reverting to the old order of succession.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

This Prince was not well-known to the Egyptians, and was looked upon rather as a foreigner. He spoke Italian and French, but very faulty Arabic, and was not popular. His character and actions, however, and the feelings of the people towards him, and his own attitude towards them and their representative Parliament, would require too long to describe. What interests us in connection with Fuad is the line taken by him towards his nephew, which governed his whole policy; and the support accorded him in this by the British authorities. His object was to preclude every possible chance of Abbas ever returning to Egypt, holding any property or stake in the country, or being heard in self-defence.

## CHAPTER IV

THE selection of Ahmed Fuad to succeed Hussein astonished few people more than it did the chosen Prince. There was no reason for raising him to the throne, unless it were that nobody else in Egypt probably would have accepted it. England could have placed there any candidate it chose without opposition, and Fuad was so little known to the public, or to the official world, that outside the walls of the Mohamed Ali Club few would have recognized his face in the street, or even been able to direct any inquirer to his house.

But this unexpected stroke of fortune was greeted by him with delight, and the only cloud on the horizon was the fear that some day either Abbas Pasha might be brought back by the English or his heirs might oust Fuad and his descendants.

Meanwhile Abbas Hilmi was living quietly and poorly in Switzerland, whither he had transferred his domicile before the end of 1914. On arriving at Berne, as a matter of courtesy if for no other reason, the Ex-Khedive had called on the British Legation, but as no notice was taken of his visit he could do no more than await developments, getting more and more straitened in circumstances as the small sum he had brought from Turkey dwindled away in meeting current expenses. It is true that he was periodically

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

approached by British Agents of the Intelligence or Secret Service with casual offers of an annual allowance of £20,000, and up to £24,000, if he would hand over all his possessions in Egypt and renounce all his rights in that country. But no details were given whence this pension was to be drawn or by whom it would be paid, and Abbas Hilmi was not then reduced to sufficient extremities to make the offer tempting. He had not yet contemplated the possible sale of all his possessions and the disposal of the proceeds without his being consulted, and he believed that some day all might be restored to him.

Later, in the summer of 1917, Sir Horace Rumbold, who had been instructed to abstain scrupulously from all personal intercourse with the Khedive, sent Lord Acton from the Legation on a mission, to speak in his stead. Lord Acton merely presented a document for signature, declaring that the Khedive abdicated all his political rights in Egypt in perpetuity for himself and his descendants, and transferred all his property there to England in return for an annual sum of £20,000. Various other humiliating conditions were attached which the Khedive did not feel he could accept, and he gave Lord Acton his reasons for declining, amongst which were the facts that the bulk of the properties in Egypt had been officially valued at over £2,500,000, and the amount of £20,000 per annum as pension was manifestly and absurdly inadequate, inasmuch as

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Ismail had been granted £40,000 a year by the Egyptian Government.

Lord Acton, however, whilst professing some sympathy with the views of Abbas Pasha, regretted that his instructions did not authorize him to modify the document in any sense; and he took it away with him.

After he had left, the Khedive sat alone in his hotel and reflected bitterly on his desperate situation. Cut off from all relations with former friends, he was absolutely and completely at the mercy of England. In the cataclysm of the War his case was not worth a moment's consideration to the British, nor to any living soul except himself. Any officer of Intelligence or Secretary of Legation was good enough to be sent to him with degrading propositions; and he had come very nearly to the end of his financial resources. Nor did he know anything of what was going on in respect of his lands and revenues in Egypt except that they were in the hands of official British Receivers; and he must have felt himself horribly deserted and alone at that moment.

Finally he decided that, though he would never sign the document presented to him by Lord Acton, he might embody the essentials in a new formula which he would sign, bowing to fate by abdicating all rights to his throne and property.

He even wrote out a recognition of the Proclamation



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

dethroning him and, having affixed his signature, he dispatched the deed by messenger, addressed to Sir Horace. Never before or since have a throne and fortune been so simply signed away; but in an hour the messenger brought back the big envelope with the seal unbroken. Sir Horace had not thought fit to receive it. How many thousands of pounds, and what innumerable difficulties, might have been spared had the British Minister accepted the sacrifice he blindly refused! I learned the story from an unimpeachable source that defies contradiction; and if there is any detail that is incorrectly given, the principal actors are still here to testify.

In 1918 Abbas Pasha succeeded in having an application made to the Residency in Cairo, through the good offices of the Dutch Minister, for information concerning the administration of his properties, but this remained without satisfaction.

The offers made by the Military and by the Legation in Switzerland to come to an agreement with the Ex-Khedive lead to the conclusion that the British Government were desirous of obtaining a legal right to dispose of his properties, which, so far, they purported to be administering for his benefit. This assumption is confirmed by the dispatch to Constantinople later, in May 1920, of Mr. Hayter, Legal Counsellor to the Sultan in Egypt. Though he was an Egyptian functionary, he was entrusted with making

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

three alternative concrete proposals on behalf of the British Government to Abbas Pasha, who by that time had temporarily returned to Turkey.

The properties of the Khedive had already, a year before, been handed over by the Military Authorities to a Public Custodian appointed to deal with enemy property in Egypt. But the estates of Abbas Pasha were not exactly in the general category of confiscated enemy goods, having been first and last sequestered in order to protect his interests. This attitude towards him had now changed. As it was now desired by England and King Fuad to deprive him of all stake in Egypt, it was evident that he would have to be separated from his properties—by agreement, if possible; if not, by force. The mission of Mr. Hayter was an attempt to come to some mutual settlement, in order to avoid resort to extra-legal violence. The mere proposal of terms was itself a recognition that an acceptance of them was necessary, in order to be able to transfer a valid title to any future buyer.

This is clearly stated in the Memorandum presented by Mr. Hayter, which is worth quoting at some length to show how carefully the matter had been gone into by the British Government:

(1) His Majesty's Government has decided that the time has come for the liquidation of the property and estates of the ex-Khedive in Egypt. It is not however intended to apply the proceeds of such liquidation as proceeds of

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

the sale of enemy property under the Treaty of Peace, and His Majesty's Government will, subject to the condition stated below, give directions for the payment of the net proceeds of the liquidation to the ex-Khedive. This condition is that the ex-Khedive should renounce all right to hold immovable property in Egypt in the future, and should authorize the Egyptian Government [note that the Egyptian Government is here substituted for the British] to dispose on his behalf of all such property coming to him by gift, inheritance, or otherwise.

(2) The Public Custodian of Enemy Property in Egypt has advised that the landed estates can be sold to better advantage if a clear title can be shown, and that this can best be effected by means of a definite authorization signed by the ex-Khedive for the sale of his estates. The Daira Khassa (Private Property Office of the ex-Khedive) has given a guarantee for the payment of principal and interest of the debentures of the *Société des Biens Fonds Urbains et Ruraux*, as long as the shares in that Company are in the possession of the ex-Khedive. A complete liquidation of the whole property can only be effected within a reasonable time if the ex-Khedive will transfer his shares in this Company to the Public Custodian for liquidation.

(3) It would thus appear to be in the interests of the ex-Khedive to sign an authorization to the Public Custodian for the sale of his landed estates, and to transfer to him for liquidation the shares above mentioned. If, however, the ex-Khedive is not prepared to take such steps, the Public Custodian will be directed to proceed to the liquidation of the estates in such manner as he may think suitable.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Paragraphs (4), (5), (6) and up to paragraph (10) inclusive, contain variants and alternative suggestions.

Paragraph (11) runs:

If the ex-Khedive will not accept either alternative he should be informed that his property and estates in Egypt will be liquidated by the Public Custodian, but that the net proceeds will not be paid to him until he has signed the declaration as to future property.

Three different forms were sent for Abbas Pasha to choose from, to any one of which he was asked to consent and affix his seal.

On May 29, 1920, Abbas Hilmi replied as follows:

The Note remitted concerning the decision of the British Government *re* the liquidation of the goods and private property of H.H. Abbas Hilmi in Egypt has been examined very carefully, but without the help of any document.

(I) Having never had any knowledge of this decision, His Highness desires to learn if he can be put in possession of the text, and to know if he is without remedy for following up the only step<sup>1</sup> taken by the Dutch Representative. His Highness has a copy of an official letter signed by Sir Reginald Wingate, dated the 12th July, 1918, No. 472/34, which recognized the right of the Egyptian Government to occupy itself with the question of his properties, and declared that the British Government was unable to reply to our demand for information.

(II) As to the offer of purchase by the Egyptian Govern-

---

<sup>1</sup> This was a request for information and accounts in the matter of property in Egypt.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

ment, His Highness remembers that in 1911 Boutros Mishaka Pasha, High Officer of Egyptian Finance, and Director of the Daïra Khassa, made an estimate for this same property amounting to the sum of more than two millions of Egyptian pounds. On the other hand, the ground rents amounted in the year 1914 to more than 70,000 Egyptian pounds.

(III) It is stated in the said note that there is a charge of about £500,000 pounds to His Highness's debit with the Credit Foncier. But a half of this amount, viz. 250,000 Egyptian pounds, was to be borne by Mr. Zervudachi, and covered by the property of Sherbina, of which all the judgments before the tribunals were given before the holidays of the Mixed Tribunals in 1914.

There are various other financial considerations in the succeeding paragraphs, and the fact of all the properties having been constituted Wakouf is insisted upon.

Mr. Hayter replied in a further note, in which he withdrew the offer he had made in the name of the Egyptian Government to purchase the estates for a lump sum of £830,000 pounds.

The correspondence closed with a short note, dated June 4, 1920, from the Ex-Khedive, which reads:

His Highness has received the letter which Mr. Hayter sent him in reply to his letter of the 20th May regarding the proposal for the liquidation made in the name of His Britannic Majesty's Government for the properties of His Highness in Egypt.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, His Highness

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

wishes to make the following two remarks on the contents of the reply signed by Mr. Hayter:—

On the subject of paragraph 2, His Highness declares that he never had any idea of a sale, and never gave particulars or estimates except merely from memory.

The Note of His Highness having been prepared with a view to its being presented to the Government of His Britannic Majesty, His Highness considers he has had no relations whatever with the Egyptian Government.

From the day he left Turkey in 1914 the Khedive had never recognized any authority in Egypt but that of Great Britain, or held any communication with Egyptian authorities.

Although the mission of Mr. Hayter failed to induce the Ex-Khedive to come to any agreement which would give the British or Egyptian Governments any title to sell, or to transmit to putative buyers, this was no bar to an arbitrary sale being ordered by the Military Authorities and carried out through the Public Custodian. His Highness has always contested the legality of such a forced sale, but legal issues are outside the scope of this work. In all subsequent proceedings the British and Egyptian Governments seem to have acted in the closest harmony and to have had a common interest and a common object. This was to obliterate all memories of Abbas Pasha from Egypt, to transfer all his estates and property to King Fuad and his Government, and above all to preclude the Ex-Khedive from

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

any possible appeal to any Court, or any jurisdiction, against their measures.

It is quite comprehensible that King Fuad should be anxious to attain all these objects. But what was the interest of the British Government in preventing any semblance of an inquiry or hearing of the complaints of Abbas Hilmi Pasha is not so clear. It is a recognized rule, if not a very moral one, that when an error or wrong has been perpetrated it should never be allowed to be called in question. Whether the British Authorities in Egypt realize that their action in the matter of Abbas Pasha was at least open to considerable criticism, or whether they merely wish to please King Fuad, they have used, and are using, every weapon at their disposal to bury Abbas Pasha alive, together with his possibly awkward grievances. They were enabled to do this without much difficulty under Martial Law, which, like charity, can and too often does cover a multitude of sins.<sup>1</sup> But several of the worst blows dealt at His Highness's rights and liberties of action were delivered by means of "*Decree Laws*", passed in the absence of Parliament, and never regularly voted. These laws could never have been put into effect without the approval and the available executive and material force of British officials behind

<sup>1</sup> Anybody who has been connected with the rule of Martial Law can recall countless abuses committed in its name.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

them, and their constitutional validity has been much questioned in Egypt.

The first and seemingly insuperable obstacle to the sale of the Ex-Khedive's properties was that they had all been constituted "Wakouf". Now, Wakf lands are, by religious law, inalienable by the temporary beneficiary. This, however, was a trifle for King Fuad and his British partisans. A "Decree Law" was simply promulgated to the effect that in the future no Wakf would be valid in Egypt unless it were constituted by an Egyptian Kâdi in an Egyptian Mehkemeh. Alternatively it could only be transcribed to the registers of the district in which it was situated. As for Wakfs duly constituted in other countries (as the Khedive had made his estates Wakouf in Constantinople), they must be transcribed in the proper Egyptian district registers before the end of November, a time limit within which it was impossible for Abbas Pasha to act, as the British and Egyptian authorities knew very well.

Nevertheless, when the Public Custodian was trying to sell several palaces and properties that were Wakouf, the Princess Kemaleddin, sister to His Highness Abbas Hilmi, brought an action against all the Egyptian Authorities concerned with Wakf matters, and also against the Public Custodian. She asked that the lands should be declared inalienable, and that they should be handed over to her by the Public Custodian to be managed for the account of the Ex-Khedive by herself



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

and her husband. The Custodian, who was ostensibly appointed "to protect His Highness's interests" and fight his battles, made default, declaring he was not amenable to any Court in Egypt. Though thus availing himself of his military qualification in order to save himself from appearing to defend His Highness, or rather defend himself from carrying out a measure he was ordered to execute by the G.O.C., the Custodian was ready later to appear, even when he was expressly excluded by Decree Law from all obligation to do so, when it was a matter of paying away money belonging to His Highness.

The other parties attacked by the Princess attempted to shift the responsibility on to the Military and to each other's shoulders. But the Court continued to hear the case, and it was soon apparent that there was little chance of its ever deciding against the Princess. This led to the promulgation of the famous Law 28, of which more anon.

But no legal or other protests affected the Public Custodian, who placidly continued to sell as fast as he could, and to pay away all claims with the easy generosity that accompanies dealing with other people's money.

It was the action of the Princess Kemaleddin which really led to the promulgation of Law 28 of July 17, 1922, after this suit had dragged on for a year and, as far as it went, tended towards a success for Her

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Highness. It was imperative from the British and Egyptian standpoint that neither Abbas nor any representative of his should ever be able to call legally in question the sales that were proceeding as, apart from the consideration of their justification in law, the prices paid were a public scandal.<sup>1</sup>

There is, however, little profit in enlarging upon this subject. There has never been any serious denial of the claim that the properties of Abbas Hilmi Pasha were given away for a mere song. Perhaps it would not have been easy to get much more at that moment,

<sup>1</sup> As no accounts have ever been rendered by the Public Custodian to Abbas Hilmi Pasha, the sums given for various properties were not always known. Nothing was sold by public auction, and the lots were usually so large that bidders could scarcely be expected to be numerous in any case. But when it was known, as it was within twenty-four hours, that the King and the Egyptian Government were joint buyers to any amount, it can easily be understood that no Egyptians dreamed of competing. They merely shrugged their shoulders and smiled, as they heard day after day of the luxurious Palaces and splendid properties of Abbas Hilmi being given away by the Public Custodian for the only bids he could get. As a small example, the Mariut Estate, which before the War and during it, brought in annually at least £4,000 a year from its orange groves, went to King Fuad for £8,000. The urban properties in Cairo, consisting of the residential mansions known as Immeubles A, B, C, D, were disposed of for about one-half their notorious value, and the administration that records transfers of title refused to accept fees on the price given as being manifestly fraudulent, and charged and received double fees for registration. Some details of this enormous operation must exist in the archives of the Public Custodian, and they must be curious and instructive reading.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

especially against Palace buying. If time had been given and the Ex-Khedive had been allowed to dispose of his own property, as was done in the case of the Sultan of Turkey, more than double would probably have been realized. It is not, however, the amount of the loss that requires explanation so much as the justification for the whole business, of which the fixed and hurried sales, though financially important, were only a secondary feature.

As the action of Princess Kemaleddin proceeded, and as it seemed that if ever a verdict were to be given it would probably assert the inalienable character of Wakfs constituted in due form in Constantinople in 1914, it became desirable to quash these and all possibly similar endeavours to introduce the Tribunals into questions relating to Abbas Pasha, and into measures taken under Martial Law.

It was under these conditions that Law 28 of July, 1922, was edicted by the King with the approval, and perhaps advice, of the British. According to the Organic Law then in force, Article 9, "No law shall be promulgated without having first been submitted for advice to the Legislative Assembly. Every disposition relating to internal affairs of Egypt, and touching the powers in the State, or declaring by general measure the political or civil rights of the inhabitants, as well as every Decree regarding public administration, shall be regarded as law. Any other disposition can be made

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

in virtue of a Decree promulgated by Us on advice of Our Council of Ministers."

The Legislative Council had not sat since the War, and was never to sit again, and such routine legislation as had been necessary had been embodied in "Decree Laws"—which were expected some day to receive the sanction of the Legislative Assembly or some equivalent representative body—or simply that of Proclamation under Martial Law.

As the Constitution which was to be the Magna Charta of Egyptian liberty was then in process of being drafted, Law 28 would have to be promulgated before it came into force, or be framed so as to come under its provisions eventually. There were already considerable differences of opinion regarding the powers and prerogatives of the Throne and the Nation (represented by the Ministers and Parliament), and England did not seem to be exercising any great pressure either way until the need for Law 28 came to be felt. The Constitution would give many hitherto untasted delights to the people; and there was a very universal desire in Egypt to be endowed with a liberal Constitution, and one which would in some directions restrain the preponderant influence which the Throne sometimes exercised previously. The King was by no means as keen as the Ministers on having the Constitution signed, but he did feel very anxious to get Law 28 passed.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

England appears to have been sitting on the fence, as she also wanted the Law 28 to ward off all trouble with Abbas Pasha; but as the King wanted the Law, and the People wanted the Constitution, England was able to make her consent to both conditional on terms of her own. What these terms were has not been divulged, but the usually inspired *Times* Correspondent in Cairo telegraphed (*The Times* of May 27, 1927): "*It may fairly be argued that H.B.M.'s Government would not have negotiated what is known as Law 28 with any Ministry which had not accepted that Declaration.*" (This refers to the Declaration of February 8, 1922, granting Independence and the Constitution.

From this it can only be deduced that Law 28 was the subject of negotiation between the British and Egyptian authorities, but it is not by any means clear in what spirit the British entered into, or concluded, the negotiations which resulted in the promulgation of Law 28 as a "Decree Law", without the sanction of any representative body.

Though this Decree Law was, after a fashion, consecrated and legalized by the Act of Indemnity, it was not passed by any Parliament till quite recently, as a consequence of its *de facto* confirmation both in the Act of Indemnity and in the Constitution itself.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Constitution, Article 168: "*The provision of Law No. 28 of 1922, determining the liquidation of the properties of the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha, and defining the restriction of his rights, are considered as being clothed with a constitu-*

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

In order to understand how thoroughly the British and Egyptian Governments collaborated in the work of destroying every chance that Abbas might ever possess in Egypt of obtaining a hearing in the Courts, the text of Law 28 of July, 1922, is given.<sup>1</sup> Not being a member of the legal profession, the writer is unable to state if there has ever existed a precedent for such a piece of legislation, but to the man in the street it is a masterpiece of autocratic over-riding of the admitted right of any subject to appeal to the justice of his, or any other, country.

By the second paragraph of Art. I, it was provided that suits like the action pending by the Princess Kemaleddin were "inadmissible before any jurisdiction of the Country, and must be rejected as of right and finally".

*tional character. They cannot be made the subject of any proposal for revision."* This was signed in April, 1923. Later, on account of a French lawyer having successfully intervened on behalf of some interest of the Ex-Khedive in the Alexandria Mixed Courts, the King took alarm, and issued an extraordinary Supplement in the official journal, containing what was styled an "*Interpretative Decree Law of Law 28 of 1922*". This will be found in the Appendix (No. III); but when Parliament met in 1927 with the right of free discussion, it had before it a sheaf of the famous "Decree Laws" that had never received the validity required of a Parliamentary vote. The Chamber at once threw out the Interpretative Law as being anti-Constitutional, as it would also have repealed the original No. 28 had it not already passed into the voted Constitution.

<sup>1</sup> Appendix II.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Article 3 requires some explanation when it says that all property, sum, or credit coming to Abbas Hilmi was to be seized administratively by an "Administration of State". This "Administration" resolved itself ultimately into a Commission of three, presided over by a Secretary of Finance named by the Palace. The sums it expected to encash and administer were the inalienable revenues of Wakfs constituted for the benefit of Abbas Pasha—mostly, if not exclusively, family Wakfs. As these Wakfs usually are apportioned amongst several brothers and sisters, the amount coming to each is well known. There are practically negligible administrative expenses. It is a matter of public knowledge that in such and such a Wakf, Abbas Pasha has the same interest as the other collaterals. Under one or two heads alone it is asserted and not denied that the Commission which collects these revenues (and by the Decree appointing it, which see, is bound to publish accounts *annually* and pay the balance out to Abbas Pasha) must now have approximately £50,000 accumulated in its hands. Yet it has never made a single publication of accounts, nor offered to pay any sum over. Since Law 28 was negotiated by the British Government, who still keep an Adviser to watch over the honest working of Egyptian Finance and the interests it administers, it may well be asked what the Adviser is doing.

It was British officials who dethroned and exiled

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Abbas Pasha, who seized all his properties, forcibly sold them at ridiculous prices, and then negotiated a law that prevented him from applying to the Courts for redress. In this law (Law 28) there is a provision that an Egyptian Administration be provided to collect the revenues that may, and do, still accrue to the Ex-Khedive, and that the same Administration or Commission is *annually to publish its accounts in the Official Journal and pay over the balance due to Abbas Pasha.*

One of the reserved points alleged to have been stipulated for by the British as a *quid pro quo* for the acceptance of this Law and of the Constitution, was that there should be British control over Egyptian Finance by a British Financial Adviser. Yet the Egyptian Financial Commission has continued for five or six years to collect the revenues of Abbas Pasha, and has never published any accounts nor paid over any money. And the British Government, whose British Adviser must be aware of this lapse, preserves a benignant attitude of non-interference.

We have always been patted, and have patted ourselves, on the back for the example set by us in Egypt of equity and justice, in spirit as well as in letter. We are now staying in Egypt ostensibly to safeguard our rights and those of all other residents for which we are responsible. Yet here we see a gross illegality and abuse of authority committed year after year by the Commission dealing with the funds belonging to Abbas



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Hilmi Pasha, without any concealment, and in open defiance of all constituted authority. In the time of Lord Cromer nothing similar could ever have happened, and it is not easy to understand how the Foreign Office reconciles its tolerance of a shameless and public scandal with its promptitude to intervene on even the smallest pretext when it chooses to do so.

Let us leave this far from pleasant subject with a farewell remark that abusive actions of the Egyptian Government supported by the British are not calculated to enhance the prestige or popularity of either when they are manifestly contrary to law and justice and have no excuse but a feeling of vindictiveness. It is a paradoxical truth that we generally bear a more bitter grudge and hatred against a person whom we have wronged than against one who has despitefully used us. The vicious persecution to which Abbas Hilmi has been subjected since his dethronement indicates that he must have been abominably wronged.

After the refusal of the Ex-Khedive to sign any authority to sell his properties, as proposed by Mr. Hayter at Constantinople in July, 1920, the British Government, true to its threat, gave orders in November, 1920, to the Public Custodian to proceed forthwith to the "liquidation" or forced sale of all the vast properties and interests of Abbas Hilmi in Egypt. The legality of this measure has always been queried, but this did not prevent its adoption and execution. Apart

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

from legality, the confiscation and forcible seizure of an enemy property has always been strongly deprecated and popularly condemned in England; but these are questions that lead to discussion almost *ad libitum*.

To dispose properly of such a quantity of valuable and scattered estate would have required years, and the assistance of the owner; but the object in view was to get the business over in the shortest time possible, and with the minimum of trouble and publicity. The action of the Princess Kemaleddin was somewhat annoying, but the British Custodian ignored it, and neither here nor elsewhere would he appear either for or against Abbas, allowing judgment by default to go against him in a completely fraudulent and untenable claim by the Princess Ikbāl for nearly £200,000. In fact, it seemed that the more money of the Ex-Khedive that could be paid away to any and every claimant the better pleased were the Liquidators. So fast did they work that the Government was able in about eighteen months—on July 17, 1922, two days before the promulgation of the famous Law 28—to publish a notice:

In view of the fact that nearly all the properties of the Ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha have been sold, the British Government has consulted the Egyptian Government as to the destination of the moneys constituting the net proceeds of the liquidation of such properties; it has been agreed between the two Governments that the proceeds

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

of the liquidation, after deduction of debts paid, *or the payment of which is provided for*, shall be put at the disposal of the Ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha. The necessary orders to this effect have been given to the Public Custodian.

From the wording of this note it would be thought that the liquidation was closed, and that no debt or claim *whose payment was not already provided for* would be considered as ranking.<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, after a general balance had been drawn, the net proceeds were paid to Abbas Hilmi (but without any semblance of a statement of accounts), with the exception of about £15,000 which the Public Custodian kept back—presumably for contingencies, though such seemed to be excluded by the text. In 1924 the Egyptian Government published the Interpretative Law annexed to Law 28 of 1922<sup>2</sup> in which it was provided that no Court in Egypt should hear any representative of the interests of Abbas. Cutting out the explanatory preliminaries, which, however, are well worth reading as a legal curiosity, the article of the actual Law reads:

I. The disposition of Article 2 of Law 28 of 1922, which edicts that the Ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha cannot plead in any Court ("*ester en justice*") or before any jurisdiction, save through the Administration mentioned in

---

<sup>1</sup> The Public Custodian actually closed his offices only in 1926 or 1927.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix III.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Article 4 of the said Law, should be understood to mean that the above-mentioned Administration [the Commission of three for collecting revenues] alone has the capacity to represent all the rights and interests, patrimonial and personal, of the Ex-Khedive in every suit or procedure, of whatever nature, before any jurisdiction in the country; and that in no case can the Ex-Khedive appear in Court, either in his own personal name, or through his Daïra, nor through any *Sequestrator, Liquidator, Administrator*, or any other person whatever, either as plaintiff, defendant, or in any other capacity.

Consequently:—

(1) Every suit or action brought or entered by or against the Ex-Khedive, either in his own name, that of his Daïra, *or by any Liquidator, Administrator*, or other individual, must be in every circumstance declared non-receivable and thrown out automatically, saving always the right of the parties to renew such suits or actions through the aforementioned Administration.

(2) Every summons by process or, generally speaking, any act of procedure of any nature in the interest of the Ex-Khedive or against him, *shall not be received, notified, or executed*, save by request or against the above mentioned Administration, etc., etc., etc. The present Law shall be submitted to Parliament on its first meeting.

*Dated 29th December, 1924.*

(It was presented and thrown out in 1927, as already mentioned.)

From the date of the publication until the day it was repealed in 1927, the Interpretative Law thus

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

most distinctly relieved the Public Custodian of all responsibility; as his very existence was not to be recognized by any jurisdiction in Egypt. It is true that he had frequently treated the processes of Egyptian Courts with contempt, and consistently declined to appear before them whilst he was engaged in the sale and liquidation of the properties of Abbas. In the trumped-up case of the Princess Ikbāl against the Ex-Khedive, it would have sufficed for him to appear to prevent a judgment for over £150,000 being given against Abbas in May, 1923; more than a year after the order had been given to close the liquidation.

The Public Custodian, however, continued to deal with the affairs of the Estate; and though all creditors had had ample time to put in their claims and appeared all to have been satisfied, a new claim was brought in 1925 after the publication of the Interpretative Law. Neither the Public Custodian nor his advisers, nor the public, could have had any belief in the genuineness of this demand for some £20,000 with interest, made by individuals formerly employed in the Daīra of Abbas Hilmi. The Public Custodian could have afforded to meet any summons to defend it with a reference to the Interpretative Law; but although he had refused to defend the Ikbāl Khanem case, where he had a certainty of winning, he elected to appear and be condemned in a claim against which he had no evidence to bring. Thus probably went the

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

last few thousand pounds in the possession of the Public Custodian, who almost immediately after closed down his office and presumably turned over the relics of all the affairs he had been handling since 1919 to the "Administration" named in accordance with Law 28, which alone had legal right to act in any sense for Abbas since 1922. This, however, is a mere supposition, and possibly the £15,000 was deposited with the Administration, or with the Residency. The Custodian certainly seems to have had no right to pay it away to fictitious or real creditors, nor had the Court any right to admit him to plead, if it did so. In any case he never paid the money to the Ex-Khedive, to whom it belonged.

In 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne had been signed and provision had been made for the restoring of their properties to Turkish nationals. The articles concerning this question had been left till almost the last day. When they came before the Conference, Sir H. Rumbold rose to assert that "the estates and properties of Abbas Hilmi were excluded from the operation of the Treaty as having been made the object of a special arrangement". On these grounds Ismet Pasha, the Turkish Delegate, passed the article; but on the next or following day he learned that Abbas Hilmi Pasha had consistently and repeatedly refused to come to any of the arrangements that had been proposed to him. Hereupon Ismet is reported to have remarked,

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

“Had I imagined that a British Ambassador would have stated that an arrangement had been come to when nothing of the sort had occurred, I would never have consented to the article excluding Abbas”. He at once wrote in this sense to Sir H. Rumbold, protesting formally that no arrangement had ever been agreed to by Abbas, and that he withdrew his assent to the statement and article. On the last day of the Conference Sir H. Rumbold made the explanation that he referred to an arrangement made “with the Egyptian Government”; and that the exclusion must be maintained. Ismet Pasha replied—they were then getting into their cars for the last time, not to meet again—that he must ask for his letter of protest to be inserted in the Protocol, as invalidating his consent, to which Sir H. Rumbold agreed. But the text of the Treaty excludes the properties of Abbas Hilmi, even if the protest of Ismet Pasha is annexed. By this strategem, to call it by no more severe name, another nail was driven into the coffin in which it was purposed to bury Abbas and his grievances.

## CHAPTER V

BEFORE turning back to Egypt it may be as well to complete the tale of the Odyssey of the Ex-Khedive and the British Government.

Abbas Hilmi Pasha, after his refusal of the offers made to him by Mr. Hayter on behalf of the British and Egyptian Governments, learned that all his possessions were sold without his consent and without any information being given to him, either of the manner in which they were being disposed of, of the prices that were being obtained, or of the sums that were being paid away to all who claimed to be owed money, without consulting him as to the validity of any of the alleged debts. He attempted to obtain access to the British authorities to represent the enormous damage he was suffering, but nothing he could do was of any avail to obtain a hearing, or permission to return to England and endeavour to seek redress in person.

He was present in Lausanne at the time of the Conference, and succeeded in persuading the British Delegates there to send a Foreign Office official to see him at his hotel, but what passed between them did not transpire, and it is probable that Abbas Hilmi confined himself to generalities, in the absence of either of the Members of the Delegation. In any case, Abbas Pasha failed to obtain a *visa* to make even the shortest visit to England, though he was free to enter



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

any other country, Egypt of course being also barred.

As all Egyptian jurisdiction was now closed to him and to anybody acting in his name, Abbas Hilmi conceived the idea of presenting a Petition of Right to the British Crown. He did this in the quality of a British or British-Egyptian protected subject, as the Treaty of Lausanne had not yet been signed providing for the definition of the future status and nationality of the Egyptians, and especially of Turks resident or established in Egypt. Until the War, of course, Egyptians were nominally under the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey.

Abbas Hilmi as Khedive considered himself as pre-eminently entitled to every privilege any of the subjects he ruled over enjoyed, and thus to have the right to plead for justice as belonging to a country which was still under a British Protectorate. This question of nationality was always a very difficult and delicate one and has never yet been definitely settled in his case.

The Petition of Right was rejected on technical grounds, because it was ruled that it had imputed a *tort* to the King, who can do no wrong. Meanwhile the Treaty of Lausanne had been signed, and Mixed Arbitral Tribunals established to try cases arising out of claims between nationals of the belligerent Powers founded upon measures or consequences of war. According to certain articles of the Treaty, Turks



ABBAS II



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

resident or domiciled in Egypt were free to opt for Turkish or Egyptian nationality, and in certain cases provision was made for the restoration to Turks of their property that had been confiscated in other countries.

Abbas Hilmi Pasha thereupon, after consulting several international jurisconsults of established authority, resolved to put in a claim before the Anglo-Turkish Arbitral Tribunal in the quality of a Turkish national—a status which seems to have been implicitly recognized at Lausanne in discussions concerning him between the British and Turkish delegations.

At first the objection was raised that as he had brought a Petition of Right as an Anglo-Egyptian subject, it was absurd for him now to plead as a Turk. To this the answer was made that it was a pure and simple question of fact, and not of what Abbas Hilmi Pasha had done. Any man may indeed claim to be an Englishman (as many Armenians had done) or a Chinese, but that does not make him so, and his nationality can only be determined by the facts concerning his life. He actually is clothed with the status resulting from these facts, quite irrespective of whatever he wishes to be, or calls himself.

Several pundits of European renown were set to work to prove the Turkish nationality of Abbas Hilmi, which had always been and still was and is fully recognized by the Turks themselves. In fact it was never

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

queried by any Power except by England, and then only when it was a vital question, apparently in order to decide the competence of an Anglo-Turkish Arbitral Tribunal to try his claim.

The British team of lawyers, headed by Sir Maurice Amos, an ex-Adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Justice, wrote "*conclusions*", Memoranda, and Counter Memoranda to the Egyptian Counsel's arguments, both being almost entirely devoted to the proof or disproof of the right of Abbas Hilmi to plead as a Turkish national.

Considering the magnitude of the claim (over (£2,800,000) and the eminence of the lawyers engaged, a long and costly preparation was called for on both sides, and several of the leaders spent something like a year in Constantinople to get up their cases. If it is ever fully reported in any publication of Law Reports or collection of standard cases it must afford interesting reading, and a great deal of instructive and contradictory argument affecting similar claims. But it will chiefly be of value to international lawyers, and is scarcely worth analyzing at length for the edification of the public.

After nearly two years' preparation the pleadings took two days, and six weeks later the sentence of the Court was delivered, in June, 1927.

It must have been a great disappointment in some ways to most of the counsel concerned, whose principal

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

efforts were known to have been concentrated on the question of nationality. If this were decided in favour of Abbas Hilmi the Court would, it was believed, declare itself competent; and an examination of the main issues, or of the subject of the claim, could hardly have resulted otherwise than in awarding something very substantial to Abbas Hilmi. There could be no denial of the losses he had sustained by the manner in which his property had been sold, and as they could hardly be restored to him he would have had to be compensated.

To the general astonishment of most concerned, when the judgment was pronounced the point of nationality was left on one side, and the incompetence of the Tribunal was declared on far from facile interpretations of several articles of the Treaty of Lausanne. The text of the judgment will be found in Appendix VI and will repay careful reading. The only remarks that need to be made are that the judgment is not correct in stating that Abbas Hilmi was living in Constantinople when he was officially dethroned. As has already been said, he had left Turkey for Switzerland about a fortnight before the Proclamation deposing him was published.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It may be retorted that, at any rate, he had a Palace there, but at that date he had several Palaces in Egypt, and villas in European capitals. He has, in fact, never lived in his Palace at Tchiboukli, and he mostly uses his yacht as a residence when he visits his Bank at Stamboul. His business domicile is supposed rather to be at Geneva.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Arguments are also founded on the statement that Egypt was already an independent State before the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. But in strict law Egypt is not independent in the most exact meaning of the word until she has come to an agreement with England over the "four reserved points", for until that has been achieved "*the status quo in these matters remains*" the same as it was under the Protectorate.

However, the last thing I should dream of would be to hazard a legal criticism of one of those hair-splitting judgments. The most astounding passages thereof are the details as to costs. Probably the two parties spent over £50,000—perhaps £80,000—over this big tit-bit. In England two years of such a case would perhaps run to nearly twice as much.

Here, after disposing of a claim for £2,800,000, the Tribunal condemned Abbas Hilmi to pay to the Court for expenses incurred in the procedure £T250 (Turkish Pounds)—equal to less than £30 sterling—and to the British Government, for costs and expenses, £T500 (Turkish pounds)—less than £60 sterling.

I say that the Tribunal disposed of the case, because unless Abbas Hilmi can amend his Petition of Right or find some International Court to which his case can be brought, the decision of its own incompetence by the Arbitral Tribunal puts an end to all appeal in that direction. So far then the British Government has succeeded in escaping from any trial of the case, or

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

from any publicity being accorded to the complaint of the Ex-Khedive.

It might have been thought that if, for some obscure or secret political reason, the British Government does not wish its action in regard to Abbas Hilmi to be inquired into publicly, it would at least have privately approached His Highness with a substantial *ex-gratia* compensation for what it is impossible to deny was a most wholesale spoliation of a defenceless victim. If the Government believed in the justice of the cause, why should it not agree to the appointment of a Parliamentary Commission, or an inquiry by a Board of expert arbitrators—the costs to be paid by each party, or by the loser?

Since the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal, Abbas Hilmi Pasha has not taken any other official steps; indeed, it is hard to see what more he can do with any hope of succeeding against the too clear determination of the British Government to decline any challenge to decide the case by law, and its almost certain refusal to bring it under any international arbitration should Abbas Hilmi himself or any foreign Power propose such a solution.

It has frequently been asserted that considerable offers have been tentatively made by the Egyptian Government to settle all the claims of the Ex-Khedive, but that His Highness has consistently refused from the first to recognize or have any dealings with any



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Power but England, and especially to enter into any official relations whatever with the Egyptian Government. I am not able to confirm or contradict alleged offers from Egypt, but it is very likely that something of the kind has taken place with the consent, if not at the instigation, of the Foreign Office. It would be easier and more satisfactory for us that the blame should be shifted from our shoulders, if blame there be, and a private transaction between the Egyptians and Abbas Hilmi would save all scandal. But the Ex-Khedive has often made it clear that no money would ever induce him to resume any friendly connection with the Egyptian Government, which he considers has usurped his place and rights. It is true that originally the Egyptians had little to say in the matter, but the subsequent action of the authorities has done enough, in the opinion of His Highness, to forbid him to accept any offer, even of reparation, from them.

The objection of the Foreign Office to permit the Ex-Khedive to visit England is supposed to be founded on a fear of hurting the susceptibilities of King Fuad, and also lest it might be taken as a sign of mistrust in him if the ban of outlawry were to be removed from Abbas Pasha to that small extent. Consciences must be uneasy, or confidence and courage small, at Abdin Palace, if it dreads the mere contact of Abbas with England. The Ex-Khedive himself has done nothing, as far as public knowledge goes, to

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

warrant the fear that he still is, or contemplates, "intriguing" against England; and it is very difficult to imagine what chance of success he could hope for in damaging our interests in Egypt. Abbas Hilmi's worst enemies have never accused him of being a fool, and no sane man in his position would entertain the remotest idea of using England as a base of operations if he were allowed to re-visit his friends and extend his business operations in Great Britain. It would, in fact, be the last place he would think of in which to pursue his famous intrigues.

In the present circumstances, indeed, it may be doubted if he has any further desire to visit London, and he appears to have too many, and too important, interests in Turkey and in other countries to leave much room to include Great Britain in the scope of his activities.

He does, nevertheless, still continue to hope against hope that the truth may some day be known concerning the manner in which he was dethroned and has since been treated, and that, when it does, the injustice that he has suffered, or that at any rate he claims to have suffered, may be inquired into and dealt with in a spirit of equity.

If he has not been the victim, as he asserts, of British and Egyptian violation of the rules of fair play, it is to be hoped that this can and may be proved by the production of evidence that is at present lacking, and that he is entitled to demand.

## CHAPTER VI

HERE let us leave Abbas Hilmi in order to return to Egypt and the situation in Cairo, after the abolition of Martial Law and of the Protectorate, and the bestowal of "Sovereign Independence". Zaghloul did not agree to accept this gift on the conditions proposed of reserving four points to be settled with England before the Independence was to become a reality. Until that settlement was come to, the *status quo* was to remain as regarded the matters to be reserved. As these matters embraced the whole of the existing guarantees that England held for her interests in Egypt, the Constitution, the King, and the Parliament were all existing and functioning only on sufferance, and the Nationalists could not admit that they were really much better off than under Cromer or Kitchener.

A pretty full and impartial account of what happened during the War, and in the first years after the Peace, can be found in Chirol's and in Young's works, which may be conveniently used as summarizing the respective sentiments and policy of the British and Egyptians up to the open rebellion of the Zaghloulists, with the enormous majority of the country in sympathy with Zaghloul and his party.

Before the Peace Nationalism was greatly assisted by the vigorous propaganda started by the students

## *Dethronement of the Khediv*

and the whole of the young intellectuals. Propaganda, indeed, was not much required in presence of the universal feeling that Egyptians had not received fair treatment in comparison with other small folk who had not nearly so many claims (especially on the British), as they had. It was remarked, not without truth, that far more recognition and material reward had been meted out to the King of the Hedjaz<sup>1</sup> than to the King of Egypt. Most of the standing grievances against England had been aggravated by the War, and new ones added. As for British officials, instead of the three or four hundred of early days there were now at least four times as many, and it was evident that, as Young says: "There were men who wanted jobs, and not jobs which wanted men".

The Nationalists had now a recognized head in Zaghloul, who was the very man to take advantage of the situation. He had already collected round him many active and leading chiefs of parties, and lost no time as soon as the Armistice was signed in heading a representative deputation to the Residency to ask leave to go to London, to put the claims of Egypt to recognition and reward before the Great Powers when the balances were to be struck. Sir Reginald Wingate forwarded their request to London with a recommendation to grant it. Though backed by the approval of Wingate, who certainly knew much more about

<sup>1</sup> Appendix V.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

the position than anybody at home, the Foreign Office refused permission, without any reason being given.

The request was repeated by Zaghloul, again strongly backed by Wingate, and again foolishly refused. This pig-headed opposition in London to even hearing a word the Egyptians might have to say was all of a piece with our attitude at that moment. Zaghloul had once been the best co-operator, perhaps, that Cromer and Gorst had had, but when he saw, now the War was over, that he was to get no recognition or consideration, he definitely went into declared hostility to England, and became the most difficult adversary England had had to deal with. Abbas had never aimed at the expulsion of the English.

Early in January Zaghloul called a big meeting and proclaimed his programme, which was comprised in the words, "*Istiklal et Tam*", or complete independence. He would have no more foreign interference in their affairs, no more Martial Law, no more muzzling of the Press, and no more British officials, and of course no more British troops. All this was not said at once, but an intensive secret propaganda was run throughout Egypt, scarcely omitting even a hut in any village from the personal attention of the apostles of the Wafd, now the only organization in the country that was articulate. Neither King Fuad nor any other element, or any class or denomination, dared to speak in

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

mitigation of the neck-or-nothing demands of the Wafd for fear of being accused of betraying their country.

The foreigners alone blamed both Zaghloul and the British indiscriminately, and called on us to act and act quickly to defend them; but it has never needed much to start a panic amongst the foreign elements. The man who might have been equal to the emergency, even at the eleventh hour, Sir R. Wingate, met with no support whatever from the Foreign Office, which seemed sulky at the palpable errors of judgment of which all foreign opinion accused it, and, instead of doing what it could by backing Wingate, recalled him to London. He was stopped on his way and never went back. He was almost the only high official left who really knew Egypt, and was shelved and replaced by Lord Allenby, another soldier, who was completely at sea in the stormy ocean of Egyptian politics.

This swapping of horses when a swollen stream had to be crossed was followed by the immediate summoning to him of Zaghloul and his chief supporters in the Wafd by Lord Allenby, who read them a severe lecture on the evil of their ways, reminding them that there was always a rod in pickle for bad boys—quite in the best style of Cromerism. Its day was over though, and on the morrow Zaghloul and the Wafd sent in a protest, and before the following evening they were given their “lesson”, being arrested and packed

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

off to Malta. This was just what one would have expected from a gallant General, who had earned the name of "Bull" Allenby. And it had just the effect that anybody who knew Egypt could have foretold. Zaghloul and the four leaders who shared his deportation had done nothing to merit exile, which is the worst of punishments for Egyptians, who fear it more than death itself. For they had merely asked to be allowed to put their case before the Powers or the Peace Conference when they understood that they were not likely single-handed ever to get much out of Great Britain.

This was, however, an unpardonable offence at that time. No appeal from Cæsar was to be thought of, and this must be understood. The reply of the Nationalists was not long in coming. Before the War they could not do much outside the towns, but all the abuses that had prevailed in the recruiting for the Labour Corps, the conscription of donkeys and camels, the seizure of arms, and the oppressive legislation that marked the close of Kitchener's stay, had put the whole of the fellaheen on the side of Zaghloul, and this was an enormous accretion to his forces. Through the elaborate network for propaganda, woven chiefly at first by the students and taken up by the Press and voluntary workers, the Wafd had its finger on the pulse of the people, and could egg them on or hold them back almost to an inch.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

The "*Beloved Leader*", as Zaghloul had come to be called, with his three companions had been sent off on March 9th, and on the 10th a general strike was proclaimed by the students, who took care to enforce it by leading street gangs to wreck trams and shopwindows and picket public offices, whilst tearing up lamp-posts and trees, and generally indulging in a first-class riot. Finally the troops were called out, and, it is said, shot a few. As a rule, however, the troops were told not to interfere unless there was danger to foreigners, and I saw myself on that and many other days British soldiers on duty in the street looking indifferently on whilst a pack of ragged hooligans were uprooting trees, and insulting passers-by. I often asked why they did not interfere in some way, but they replied they were only there to see that nobody was murdered, or acting under some such instruction. The truth was that the approach of a corporal's guard was quite enough to send all rioters scudding away for their lives, and a single private with a rifle was sufficient to stop all demonstrations until the scum were aware that he had no orders to shoot.

There is a well authenticated story that about this date a mob of at least a couple of thousand were surging down Cherif Pasha Street in Alexandria when they were opposed by a single "Tommy" who, at twenty yards distance, shouted to them to halt. As they came on he fired one shot in the air, and then,



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

lowering his rifle to the charge, started for them with fixed bayonet. They all fled incontinently.

Personally, I perambulated the streets frequently in those troubled days both in and out of uniform, and never had more than a nasty look thrown at me by any but some of the very worst types who now and then mixed with the mob in the hope of looting. The Cairo police did very little to check the demonstrators, and Cairo was for nearly a week more or less under mob law. In the provinces things were no better; and the peasants joined actively in the movement, wrecking country stations, tearing up sections of line, and occasionally attacking trains, particularly those that were transporting provisions and goods for the Army. As there was no Government the British, who did not want to start anything like a massacre of either Egyptians or foreigners, could not do very much. They did, however, object to assaults on trains containing soldiers, or on railway stations, and in the course of the ensuing week a good many rebels lost their lives. The British nevertheless kept a pretty stiff upper lip, and did not take the growing audacity of the lower classes seriously, although all semblance of authority was now passing into the hands of the Nationalist Committees of Public Security, Councils of Village Sheikhs, and other bodies entirely under the control of the Wafd.

Abuses of many sorts sprung up, and the answer

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

to all remonstrances or expressions of surprise was invariably "*Mafish Hukoumeh* (There is no Government)". I have received this reply, accompanied by a shrug of the shoulders, a hundred times from high and low. This state of things could not go on indefinitely, and the turning-point came when a crowd of excited peasants attacked a train containing some British officers and soldiers in Upper Egypt. The victims were unarmed and taken by surprise, and two officers, an official, and five privates were murdered under circumstances of exceptional savagery. This stirred General Allenby to a sense of the realities of the revolt, and he consulted with all the representatives he could find of Egyptian opinion, pointing out the necessity of restoring order. He also established relations with the Committee of Independence, and by abstaining from the reprisals that the Egyptians were probably fearing, and promising to look into grievances, the new High Commissioner entirely turned the flank of the Extreme Nationalists, and introduced a spasmodic movement of ebb in the anti-English tide. To give more complete satisfaction to the people he pardoned Zaghloul and gave orders for his return from Malta, and permission for him to go to Paris or anywhere else he liked.

The brutal murders of Deirut had taken place on March 18th, and the release of Zaghloul was ordered on April 7th. Only three days before British troops, firing on a mob engaged in the pastime of sacking

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

some Armenian houses, had killed a dozen or so, but now all was peace and brotherly love. Opinions were very divided as to the wisdom of this sudden change of attitude, as it was almost certain to be taken as a symptom of weakness or embarrassment on our part, which it was; the only alternative lying in very stern and severe repression. The reprisals of Denshawai were still fresh in British and Egyptian memories, and Allenby was too new in Cairo to want to take any irrevocable step. So he chose the other course, but it soon appeared that he had gained little by his holding out of the olive branch.

The armistice with the Nationalists did not last a week, and picketing, intimidation, and ambushing of isolated soldiers were habitual accompaniments to general strikes, and blocking of all business, public and private.

Allenby met this with proclamations—one punishing recalcitrant Government strikers with instant dismissal and loss of pensions rights, whilst another, under Martial Law, threatening closure of all the Schools, put a temporary end to the principal obstacles to the working of the Government machine.

Zaghloul continued to do what he could in Paris, but without any tangible result to report to his party in Cairo, until the signature of the Treaty of Versailles plainly showed him and them that they would have to work out their own salvation if they were to be saved

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

from the Protectorate and indefinite dependence on England. The Protectorate had indeed been reaffirmed in the proclamation issued by Allenby on the day the Treaty was signed (April 20th). The main object of the whole effort of the Wafd was the abolition of the Protectorate, and the policy of Great Britain so far was to uphold it and to reassert its existence at every opportunity. When the Protectorate was confirmed both in Paris in the Treaty, and in Cairo by repeated proclamations, Rushdi Pasha resigned, and a stop-gap was found in the person of Mohamed Said Pasha, an able but somewhat uncertain-minded Minister, to carry on till a change might be necessary. He did not care much for British methods, but little more for those of the Nationalists, being one of the old Turkish school of diplomats by birth and training. He was popularly known as "the Byzantine".

If I have given a sufficient brief picture of what went on up to the spring of 1919 to enable the reader to follow a somewhat difficult series of events, he will have come to the conclusion that almost all the work of Cromer and Kitchener had been swept away, and that England and Egypt were on an altogether new footing. At the signing of the Treaty of Versailles there was no more question of educating the Egyptians to govern themselves, but only a recognition of the Protectorate and of the unquestioned direction of Egyptian affairs by England. So far the Treaty.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

But in Cairo it was now felt by most that no satisfactory system of Government could ever be carried on without the assistance and the real effective co-operation of the Egyptian elements in the Administrations. The passive resistance that was being practised and the *sabotage* in all the Ministries could not be allowed to continue indefinitely, and some way out must be found.

To the credit of Allenby it must be said that, in spite of his lack of local knowledge and experience, he had come in a few months to perceive more than Cromer or Kitchener had ever been able to foresee, namely, that it would be necessary to give up, some day, the too strict and galling repression of all attempts on the part of Egyptians to have an appreciable share in their own Government. And another merit that must be awarded to Allenby is that when he was in a difficulty that was beyond his capacity to grapple with he threw the decision, if he could, on presumably more and better trained shoulders.

Allenby went away for the summer on leave to think the matter over, and the more he thought of it the less his soldier soul liked the idea of having to bolster up the Protectorate in spite of all our promises to the Egyptians to give them independence. He seems to have persuaded them at home that there was no real improvement, and never would be, in the feelings of Egypt towards us until we changed our attitude towards them. So he was able when he returned in November

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

to issue a new Proclamation declaring that English policy in Egypt was to "establish a constitutional system, in which . . . the Sultan, his Ministers, and the elected representatives of the people . . . may co-operate in the management of Egyptian affairs". It was further said that a Mission was to be sent to Egypt to work out the new Constitution.<sup>1</sup> But though this was a step in the right direction perhaps, there was no word of abolishing the obnoxious Protectorate, though Allenby had probably already in his mind the complete abandonment of the old policy, without venturing to go so far as this in the beginning. If what Allenby did had been done by Cromer, he would have been credited with provoking all the series of events that led up to the situations that ensued, most of which might have been predicted by a subtle mind. But Allenby simply saw what anybody could see, and was content to meet the necessities of the day, hoping the best for the morrow.

The announcement of the dispatch of the Milner Mission was regarded in England as a tremendous concession, and as part-abandonment of our previous policy; but the Egyptians did not look at it in at all the same way. In fact they sought in vain for the

<sup>1</sup> The Terms of Reference of the Milner Mission were: "To suggest a Constitution which, under the Protectorate, was best calculated", etc. Allenby had not yet declared his own view that it might be necessary to abolish the Protectorate.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

abolition of the Protectorate, and did not care for a Constitution that was to be worked for them by the British. They therefore decided to boycott the Mission when it came, and did so very effectually. Lord Milner arrived in December, 1919, and stayed for three months, but hardly saw any representative Egyptians except by stealth. He was nevertheless able to form a fair idea of the situation, which confirmed Allenby's view that the Zaghloulists had the whole country behind them, and that it was hopeless to hold back for ever from giving them the autonomy that they aimed at, at least in some considerable measure.

As soon as the Mission had taken ship on its homeward way, the Nationalists held an exultant meeting at the house of Zaghloul (which was styled the "House of the Nation") and voted a set of resolutions, amongst which was one that all the measures that had been passed since the Legislative Assembly had been prorogued were null and void. Amongst these was the Decree that proclaimed the Protectorate. The meeting was composed of at least three-fourths of the members of the old Assembly, and they proceeded to vote by acclamation their own Independence and their sovereignty over the Soudan.

The recommendations of the Milner Commission were not published for some months; and when they were, Zaghloul went to London to enter into negotiations with Lord Milner. The two parties came to a

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

tentative agreement which was to serve as foundation for a future Treaty. This agreement provided various privileges for Egypt; and though England still reserved the power to keep a military force in the country, this was to be "without prejudice to the rights of the Egyptian Government", and "not to constitute a military occupation". The eventual Treaty was, of course, to be passed by the Egyptian Parliament. If this agreement had been signed between Zaghloul and Milner, it is within the bounds of possibility that some practical and definite settlement might have resulted;<sup>1</sup> but when all the terms were reported back to Cairo it was soon apparent that it would not be easy to secure acceptance for several of them. Dozens of meetings were held in Egypt; two or three modifications were suggested; and especially was the abolition of the Protectorate insisted upon.

As this was already admitted in principle by us, it could possibly have been promised, and a draft drawn up and signed. This would have bound the Egyptians as far as it went, and later on a finite end to the question might have been reached. There is not much doubt that a moderate Ministry would have signed sooner or later with Lord Curzon; but the country was not behind Adli Pasha and his Liberal colleagues; and when Zaghloul returned from his long absence in April, 1921, he met with a reception that showed there

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix III.



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

was no King or Cabinet that counted beside the "Beloved Chief", as he was always called. And Zaghloul was not at all pleased that Lord Curzon had dared to treat with Adli instead of with him, and declared that no one but he had had any right to lead the delegation to London. Besides which there had been no mention of the Soudan up to now. Though Adli had succeeded in obtaining from Curzon the promise to abolish the Protectorate as soon as the Treaty was signed, there were other debatable and vexatious points, apart from the Soudan, which the Egyptians had fixed upon.

However much Lord Curzon might talk of "Independent Sovereignty", the perpetual presence of British troops in the Capital, or wherever else it might please the Commander-in-Chief to send them, and the maintenance of Judicial and Financial Advisers in control of their respective administrations, were not compatible with the Egyptian idea of Sovereignty.

The rest of the summer was spent in squabbling and rioting of different degrees of gravity, till in December Zaghloul openly defied the threats of Allenby and was deported for the second time, on this occasion to the Seychelles; and disturbances and murders became common from one end of Egypt to the other.

Allenby was then called home to be consulted, though the Government already knew his views. This time Allenby fortified his own opinion with a signed

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

report from his British Advisers, to the general effect that the situation was out of hand, and that the only way to restore quiet and preserve order was either to give Egyptians their Constitution and independence, or else keep a standing army there of at least 100,000 men. It can hardly be believed that Allenby or his Advisers really thought that any such imposing army would be required, for if the sort of mob-rule that had been established was to be quashed, the force then in the country was amply sufficient if ever it were decided to use it "hard and good", in American parlance. In fact a couple of regiments of infantry and of cavalry, with a ship or two and half a dozen air-planes, would always be enough to keep the peace if employed instantly and with severity.

The simple appearance of an armoured car or a machine-gun had never failed to produce the most complete calm; but though the alternative of Allenby seemed absurd to Englishmen on the spot, it was quite well understood at home, probably, as being a good pretext for putting an end to a position which would be the harder to improve the longer it endured. Of course, the bare thought of increasing the standing army in Egypt was not to be entertained for a moment, and Allenby had no difficulty in obtaining the consent of Mr. Lloyd George, though it was a pill that some other members of the Cabinet shook their heads over.

Allenby of Palestine was not the man to lose time

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

in pushing what was really a personal victory for him. He had had a rather stormy passage, and had certainly failed to make any progress towards a better understanding, or to any quieting down of public feeling during the years he had tried to govern by alternate conciliation and sudden and swift violence. But that was not his fault, and the end was a triumph for him, though he had made rather heavy weather on the voyage.

The day after he arrived at Alexandria (February 28, 1922) he published a brief and business-like Declaration stating that His Britannic Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declared intention, "desire forthwith to recognize Egypt as an independent sovereign State". It went on to say in the fewest words possible that the "British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State". And that as soon as an Act of Indemnity should be passed by the Egyptian Government Martial Law should be abolished. Up to this point there was nothing to alloy the gold in the gift of England to the Egyptians, but *in cauda venenum*:

The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Britannic Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

- (a) The security of the communications of the British in Egypt.
- (b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.
- (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and of minorities.
- (d) The Soudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreements, *the status quo in all these matters shall remain intact.*

These four "*reserved points*", by which term they have come to be officially known, embraced all the most serious and often galling holds that had been established by the British. England was to dispose of any forces, military, naval or aerial that she deemed necessary to guard her communications where she pleased. The protection of foreign interests involved a perpetual control over the whole administration, and the Soudan was left an open question.

No Egyptian, and least of all Zaghloul, was prepared to accept this declaration as a bestowal of sovereign independence, or anything but a qualified promise to grant some share in government to the Egyptians, and that only after an agreement had been come to on the four reserved points. The extent to which Egyptians would be permitted to start work on their Constitution and to administer their country by virtue of the same remained to be seen. Theoretically, and publicly, the Anglo-Egyptian co-administration was dead and at an end, but it did not cease, and the *status quo* stood

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

and was to be maintained, both *de facto* and *de jure*, until an agreement had been come to over the "reserved points", a very vague date to look forward to.

At this stage a practically new factor was introduced to the public in the person of the first Egyptian King. Hitherto King Fuad had confined himself to looking about him, attending to his private affairs, and handling the unaccustomed wealth that had come to him. He had hardly made his bow to the people when he was involved in a difference with Sarwat Pasha, which led to the resignation of the Premier and to the post being taken by a Palace partisan in Taoufik Nessim Pasha, who was able to do this by temporarily beguiling a strong contingent of the more extreme Wafd into a most unnatural partnership, perhaps from a suspicion that the Moderates might go too far in co-operating with the British.

Taoufik immediately set to work on the job of drafting a Constitution, and made fair progress until he inserted a clause conferring on King Fuad the title of "King of Egypt and the Soudan".

This was, of course, vetoed by Allenby and a sharp struggle was joined, in so far as any struggle could be made against England. It naturally ended in the only way, by the withdrawal of the obnoxious words, and Taoufik Pasha resigned. More rioting and bloodshed ensued, and it was not easy to find any man to face the impossible task of reconciling the various views

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

and wishes of the British, the King, and the Egyptian parties. He was, however, found at length in Yehia Ibrahim Pasha, a former Minister, of great patience and no particularly fixed convictions, who formed a mixed Cabinet in March, 1923, and succeeded in passing the Constitution about one month later, which was a great feat. This was in April, and in July the Act of Indemnity was duly passed as per schedule. Martial Law was abolished, and Zaghloul was brought back from exile and resumed his political activities at once in Cairo. He had retained the affections and loyalty of nine-tenths of his followers; nobody dared to utter a word against him without being dubbed a "traitor"; and whoso ventured to do the slightest act of co-operation was accused of being "in league with the British".

Assassination of English civil and military officials went on also without any effective check, though this was never judicially brought home to instigation or encouragement from the Wafd. The campaign of terrorism which had begun in 1921 continued till the autumn of 1923, when elections were held and resulted in an overwhelming victory for Zaghloul and the absolute annihilation of all the Opposition.

## CHAPTER VII

IN January, 1924, accordingly, Zaghloul took over the government and formed his first Ministry.

Before the elections of 1923 in England the Labour Party had plumped for full Independence for Egypt; and when it came to office and responsibility, it declared that the Declaration with its "four reserved points" was quite compatible with complete and sovereign independence, a sophistication that was not admitted by Zaghloul or any other Egyptian.

After the Parliament had convinced itself that the Labour leaders had no intention of clearing out of Egypt, it began "reprisals" by refusing to vote the subsidy that had been paid since 1882 for the maintenance of the British Army of Occupation, and showed a generally aggressive front in other directions.

Though England and Egypt equally professed to be ready and eager to discuss the reserved points, it was impossible for even Zaghloul to bring his party to listen to the British views, much less for him to extract a mandate to negotiate anything that did not include total independence for Egypt and the Soudan, which meant their evacuation. The departure of the British from the Soudan at least was to be a condition antecedent to any *pourparlers*. This condition was proclaimed in a public speech made by Zaghloul on May 5, 1924, to which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald promptly replied

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

in the House that there never was, or would be, any idea of giving up the Soudan.

The next move in the political match between the two countries was the engineering of an outbreak of mutinies in the native garrisons of the Soudan; and in September Zaghoul decided to visit London and see Mr. MacDonald personally. But as he was still a prisoner of his own words and programme, and bound moreover by pledges to his party, he could not retreat from his claim to the Soudan; and Mr. MacDonald being in much the same position it was clearly hopeless to talk, and Zaghoul returned almost immediately.

On resuming the direction of affairs he rather gratuitously defied British opinion by giving office to two notorious firebrands, who were often supposed to have known too much about the assassinations. He also declared that the presence of British officers throughout the Egyptian higher commands was degrading to the national honour. This and similar utterances were strongly objected to by the Foreign Office; and in December Sir Lee Stack, who was at the same time Governor-General of the Soudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, was shot in his carriage whilst he was in Cairo and died the following day (November 19, 1924).

The effect was deplorable from every point of view. Though Zaghoul repaired at once to the Residency to express his deep sorrow and horror at this abominable



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

crime, Allenby, with the approval of the Foreign Office, peremptorily demanded an indemnity of £500,000, the punishment of the murderers, the withdrawal within twenty-four hours of all Egyptian troops from the Soudan, the annulling of the restrictions that had been placed on the extent of areas to be irrigated by us in the Soudan Ghezireh, and immediate cessation of all opposition to British claims for the protection of foreigners and minorities.<sup>1</sup>

Zaghoul at once resigned, and three prominent members of the Wafd were arrested, whilst the Parliament unanimously sent a protest to the League of Nations against "the exploitation of a tragic occurrence for imperialist ends". Parliament was then dissolved, and Ziver Pasha took the Premiership and formed a Cabinet, with three Liberal Constitutionalist Ministers, on the day before Christmas, 1924. Egypt thus reverted to Government by the King and a Minister responsible only to him (and, of course, to the British); and legislation by decree in the absence of the Chamber. I think I can scarcely describe the action of Great Britain and its effects better than by quoting Young (*Egypt* p. 277).

It may be questioned whether it was either justifiable or judicious to enforce, as to points at issue, an *ex parte*

---

<sup>1</sup> It will be noticed that two at least of the "reserved points" were thus settled without any "friendly discussion", but rather at the point of the sword.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

settlement that was purely provisional and unlikely to be ever constitutionally ratified, as a penalty for a public crime. Both the Soudan and the Capitulations were, of course, indirectly involved in the crime, but Sir Lee Stack was murdered in Cairo as Sirdar, and not as Governor-General of the Soudan; and the crime was a political *coup* that had had no general connection with the safety of foreigners in Egypt. Nor was the final settlement of the reserved points—a settlement that had to be by mutual consent—in any way furthered by being made a penalty for this abominable crime. That crime was clearly due to a conspiracy to injure Anglo-Egyptian relations, and we played the conspirators' game by involving in it all the unsettled issues of the relationship. That it was a mistake of ours was practically acknowledged in debate by the Conservative Government when indignation had somewhat cooled down.

New elections were held in March, 1925, and the Zaghloulists were beaten apparently by a combination formed at the Palace; but when it came to electing officers for the Parliament, it was seen that many of the Wafd Party had got in under another ticket, and that it was really still in a majority of nearly fifty votes on a division. Zaghloul was, of course, named President of the Chamber; and when it was clear that the Government could not go on with a hostile Chamber, the King dissolved it after a few hours' sitting. New elections were, *pro forma*, announced for May, but with no intention of ever holding them, and Ziver continued to govern with the support of the Palace and the

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

British, against practically the wish and opinion of the whole nation.

King Fuad was assisted in his policy at this time by a fresh actor who, for a year or two, is said to have been the real ruler of the country as far as choosing men for administrative posts and influencing the King in every decision and circumstance of any importance. This was Nashat Pasha, a Court Chamberlain and Director of the Royal Cabinet. He was unknown to fame before 1921, but as soon as he was introduced into the Palace he gained the utmost favour of his master and rose by leaps and bounds to enjoy almost unbounded authority. At the same time he had made himself a *persona grata* at the Residency, especially with all the Chancery and the Councillor acting in the absences of Allenby. He was naturally in the best position to render small services of every kind, arrange duck shoots, facilitate train journeys, and do the hundred and one little favours that are really nothing at all but which count for so much.

It was Nashat who had the first idea of starting a King's Party under the name of "Ittihad", or "Union", though it was in diametric opposition to every other party and existed at first more in the imagination of Nashat than in flesh and blood. But he knew the all-conquering influence of money and place, and both of these were put at his disposal by the King.

Anybody acquainted with the habits of Eastern

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

countries will not be at all scandalized at what went on whilst the Parliament was not sitting, and whilst there was no chance of questioning or complaining. The buying of honours has always been stigmatized by English historians as a most reprehensible practice, and it was one of the first charges brought against the Sultans of Turkey, and the Khedives Ismail and Abbas Pashas.

Englishmen in Egypt were therefore rather surprised that the Residency should have assisted so indulgently at excesses in this direction. It is impossible for anybody but Nashat, probably, to be able to estimate the exact sums encashed; but the Residency replied, if any man asked why it gave such a free rein to the King, that as long as no British or foreign interest was affected it was not its business. In this it was perhaps right; and if the truth were known it would perhaps be found that the loudest cries that were heard in Egypt were raised on account of the anguished feelings of the enormous majority who could not manage to get even a crumb from Nashat's well-furnished board. At any rate there was a public scandal created by the whole system, and there was certainly the best of reasons to protest at seeing a gentleman sent as Mudir or Sub-Mudir to a province about which he knew nothing and cared less, simply because he had been able to pay thirty or forty thousand pounds to the Palace. He bought the post palpably in the hope of making a

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

great deal more out of it than he had paid, and he could only do this by practising every sort of unauthorized method of extortion. But there was no Chamber, and if the British did not interfere, certainly there was no other Olympian Power to apply to.<sup>1</sup>

King Fuad had never been popular, but he now came to be looked at with perhaps greater aversion than was felt for the British. It seemed natural, after all, to the Egyptian mind that the English should keep a strong hand over Egypt as long as they were responsible for its government, and did not too sorely oppress them. But the King was a different proposition, and if this were the way he intended to govern they had a poor prospect in the future. As the Nationalists of all shades were equally hostile to the so-called Unionist Party, and were impotent to make their voices heard constitutionally, they wisely did nothing much in the year 1925 and waited for better days.

These appeared to dawn on the horizon of hope when Lord Allenby finally departed to give place to Lord Lloyd, a former Governor of Bombay and a supposed friend of the proletariat. He came with a big reputation from India; but Egypt is not India, and required different ways of handling. Lord Lloyd, however, was

<sup>1</sup> I myself heard many tales confirmatory of the universal rumours and beliefs, but they were usually more ludicrous and amusing than calculated to excite pity or indignation on behalf of the contributors to the Palace Treasury.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

not a whit dismayed at the state of unconstitutional government by decree that obtained or the seething discontent that was bursting to find a sympathetic ear. It would indeed have taken much more than that to shake his self-confidence. No one could be in Cairo for twenty-four hours without hearing furious complaints against abuses which were all put down indiscriminately to the Palace and to Nashat Pasha. As nothing was ever done without Nashat's consent and order, public opinion could not be far wrong, and it was pretty evident that the first thing to do was to clear the air of the Nashat blight. Lord Lloyd therefore went himself to Abdin, and very simply informed the King that the time had come to send Nashat away from the Palace and from Egypt. Not yet knowing Lloyd, King Fuad objected that Nashat was one of his most valued servitors, and he would rather resign than separate from him. This was not likely to move Lord Lloyd, who said he could do as he pleased about resigning but Nashat must go. It was credibly reported at the time, and there is no reason to doubt it, that the King finally threw himself on the carpet and wept copious tears, but without avail. The only concession he was able to extract from Lord Lloyd was that Nashat should be given a diplomatic post abroad.

This was rather an extraordinary lapse on the part of Lloyd, for if the man was to be exiled because his presence was a danger and scandal to Egypt, how could

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

he be one of the first men chosen as fit to represent the country abroad with the approval of the British Government? There was of a truth great rejoicing in the land at the departure of Nashat, chiefly as being a sign that the era of arbitrary abuses was about to come to an end.<sup>1</sup> The reason that the Residency made no objection to his ultimate return and appointment to his post was said to be that it was not a government post, and that it was within the sole discretion of the King to put there whom he chose. Perhaps so; but his original position was also not a political but purely a Palace one. The British Press generally described the exile of Nashat in 1925 as a great defeat for the King, but in view of the manner in which he was dismissed and

<sup>1</sup> It may be added that Nashat was appointed Ambassador to Madrid, with salary and allowances in excess of his Palace pay, the popular charges against him being thus removed from the field of discussion, whether or not they were admitted. He was sent away with much ceremony, and interviews were arranged for him with the Premiers and other big political personages in Italy and France, where he made a prolonged stay. He left Cairo in the first week in December, 1925, but was still enjoying himself in Paris in February, when Lord Lloyd remembered him and inquired where he was. The next day Nashat received orders to take up his post; but after the visit of the King to London in 1927, Nashat was allowed, apparently by Lloyd, to return to Cairo instead of going to Teheran, to which Embassy he had been named several months previously, and he was quickly reinstated at Abdin as Director of the Privy Purse, a place which he had certainly earned and for which he seemed eminently fitted.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

the favour he continued to enjoy it was not looked at in the same light altogether by the Egyptian public.

Having put the country into good humour by his dealing with Nashat, Lord Lloyd proceeded to win more favour by promising to have elections held in the spring, and so to bring Parliament again into being and start a constitutional régime anew after the spell of personal rule by King Fuad and Nashat.

Very few men could have kept the extremely difficult and invidious position Ziver Pasha held for so long without making deadly enemies on all sides. But he finally departed without leaving any personal enmity behind him. He has always been known to all Egypt as a cynic and an independent administrator, with no very defined political convictions or creed. He is distinctly a realist of the most pronounced type and a well equipped philosopher, ready to defend his actions or opinions with pungent and witty arguments at any time. He juggled most adroitly with the question of the elections, which the King's partisans wanted to have on the new system they had introduced, whereas the Nationalists wanted the old way of direct universal suffrage. Ziver protracted the discussion till he had word from Lloyd to decide to hold the elections under the old system. They resulted in hardly a single opposition candidate being successful. There was then a Chamber almost homogeneous at first, without any party in opposition (the figures were about 200 to 12, I think).



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

The difficulty at once arose of finding a leader and a Premier to govern in harmony with the ideas of the British when in every important issue Zaghloul, and the Wafd with him, were openly pledged to non-acceptance of any of the essential conditions of England. Probably Zaghloul would have liked to try the experiment of attempting to pit his wits against those of Lloyd, but it would have been decidedly risky so soon to chance another *coup de force* and a dissolution, with a relapse into personal rule again. The King was in hopes that this might happen, but without Lloyd's countenance he would not venture a step for the moment.

There was a period of uncertainty, and the Nationalists were beginning to grow impatient to start work, when an agreement was come to by some sort of private pact between Lord Lloyd on the one side and Zaghloul with the moderate Nationalists on the other, that Zaghloul should give way to Adli for the Premiership and remain in the background ostensibly, though still exercising by far the greatest weight in the councils of the Wafd and of the whole Nationalist party. It was never known, I believe, exactly how Lord Lloyd arrived at persuading Zaghloul to resign the post of Prime Minister which was his by right, but it may be shrewdly guessed that he scared his opponents with the choice of coming into line and co-operating, at least in some degree, or either seeing the Protectorate re-established, or being left to the tender mercies of the

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Palace. These alternatives were scarcely to be endured in thought even, and the outcome was an Adli Cabinet composed partially of Wafdists.

There is no doubt that this solution was facilitated by an incident that happened just before the withdrawal of Zaghloul. Two friends of Zaghloul had been accused of participating in the murder campaign but had been acquitted, and it was known that Zaghloul intended to include at least one of them in his Ministry if he formed one. But the British judge who tried the case with two Egyptian colleagues, resigned as a protest against the acquittal of the Wafdists, as being against the weight of evidence. Many Egyptian leading lawyers to whom I have spoken about this case have declared that the resignation was planned by Lloyd, and that there really had not been enough trustworthy testimony for the Egyptians to convict upon. They themselves would not have done otherwise, and they sometimes added that there had been more circumstantial suspicion against Palace officials in previous cases than against these men.

It would never be believed for a moment that Judge Kershaw acted otherwise than in obedience to the dictates of his judicial conscience, but it is true that Egyptians in general, and more especially, I think, the Bar, did not believe in the guilt of any of the Wafd, the more so that the killing of Englishmen was the worst thing to further their cause. Those who have

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

lived long in the East know that in default of positive proof, the "bazar rumour," or local opinion, on current events is not often very much at fault, and nothing was ever actually brought home, as far as I know, to the Wafd in connection with the "murder campaign". This, however, is a mere personal impression.

The situation in 1927 was as follows. The Parliament which now represents the people of Egypt was at first more opposed to the Palace than to the British. In the Chamber there was by this time a large leaven of more or less reasonable thought, and a number of younger and more progressive members who were already exercising no small influence, and gradually making Zaghloul feel that he could no longer count blindly on leading the whole of his party behind him wherever he chose to point. This new element had as yet formed no party or group, but was infiltrating throughout Egypt. They were inclined towards a truly Liberal constitutional policy which would tend to agreement with England, as the only way of getting rid of British intrusion and achieving the full measure of all the independence that they could ever hope for in the present state of the world and of the British Empire. Zaghloul himself was likewise realizing this necessity, and if he had lived would certainly have used all the authority he still possessed, which, however, was not what it had formerly been, to bring about an arrangement with us in respect of the "reserved points". The

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

King, seeing that it was inevitable that Britain would soon have her way, was all for making friends with the Mammon of unrighteousness before he was forestalled, and lost no opportunities of attempting to stir up enmity between the Parliament and the Residency.

Lord Lloyd, who from the beginning had assumed the rôle of Cromer as far as he was able, still had both parties under his thumb, being able to menace the Ministry with a dissolution or a Protectorate, and the King with leaving him to face the country—which would not give him a very long shrift.

In spite of all the talk of autonomy and self-government, the Ministers and the King could not adopt any measure of public or private importance without the approval of the Residency. The chief difference from the old days was that Cromer, and Kitchener in a lesser degree, acted through the advisers and British officials who interfered when they thought it necessary. In the new order of things the British were supposed to allow the Egyptians a completely free hand except where British or foreign interests were directly involved, and Egyptian Ministers and administrations were in principle entirely unfettered in carrying on their own affairs.

But this principle did not prevent Lord Lloyd from intervening very frequently, in a sort of unofficial way as a rule, but none the less authoritatively and decisively if he thought fit. For some time after his *coup* in having

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Nashat Pasha exiled, and elections held to bring the country again under Parliamentary government, he was not seen to do much in furtherance of the negotiations for settling the "reserved points", in which negotiations King Fuad wished to assist. But in several minor matters, mostly affecting the private interests and privileges of the Crown in general and of King Fuad in particular, Lord Lloyd afforded some protection to the King, and grew more inclined to enter into friendlier relations with him than formerly. In money matters, such as the regulation of the Civil List and financial deals of the King which the Parliament did not approve, King Fuad seemed to find enough support at the Residency to warn the Ministry from going farther.

This species of *rapprochement* between the High Commissioner and the Palace culminated in a visit of the King to London being arranged, which was a clever move on the part of the Palace to establish the position of King Fuad on something he could show himself to have done for Egypt. It also laid the foundation for better relations with England than had ever existed since the days when Abbas Pasha was an honoured guest at the Court of St. James in the last century. By this time Lord Lloyd, who had been anything but kind or gentle to King Fuad on his arrival, had, so to speak, thoroughly compromised himself with the Palace, which was still at open war with the Nationalist Parliament who mistrusted the King and all his

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

works. Fortunately for Egypt there are plenty of capable and moderate men available for the shaping of her destinies, but it is imperative that before any agreement can be come to between them and us some very strict and sure guarantees will have to be provided by England for the safe-guarding of the people's constitutional rights, and for preventing a second usurpation of Government by the Palace.

The King has either played a good hand since the advent of Lloyd, or he has been well advised by his new counsellors. He has certainly never been out of touch with Nashat Pasha, who is now back in Abdin; and latterly he has also added to his household a probably valuable element in the person of Hassanein Bey, the English-speaking friend and companion in her desert travels of Rosita Forbes. Both of these astute and accomplished Egyptians are small towers of strength in their way, and have a fair practical experience of English ideas and the best way to work with or against them.

It is quite natural that the King and the Palace clique, who have identical interests, should endeavour to escape as far as possible from the awkward control and inquisition that belongs to a constitutional régime, and the new Constitution gives powers that would arm any strong King to tame or overcome every opposition. But a despotism will never succeed again in Egypt any more than in any modern civilized country.

## CHAPTER VIII

THE object of the Treaty which is to be negotiated is to admit of England's allowing the Egyptians to govern themselves in some fashion or another for a while, whilst providing guarantees for the protection of our own and all the interests hitherto safeguarded by us. The arrangement that is to hand over Egypt as an internally, and as far as possible internationally, Sovereign State with a seat in the League of Nations, must above all possess the quality of permanence. It would be a sorry end to our long occupation if the Treaty were to result in a mere temporary change that would before long require readjustment.

The first essential of permanence is contentment, for as long as the Egyptians are not more satisfied with the new status that they obtain than with the Protectorate under which they have grown to man's estate, there will always be unrest and danger to the peace.

There is no use in disguising the fact that, to use a euphemism, the Nation has not always been in harmony with the autocratic ideas of the King, and that if he had not been kept on the throne by England he might not have remained there long. This is not a pleasant truth either for him or for us, but it is as well to put it unmistakably. The Constitution was too hurriedly framed under stress of the necessity of freeing the country from abuse of power by the Palace on one side,

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

and from the burden of Martial Law on the other. As it stands it is thought to give too much prerogative and too great powers to the Throne, and it would allow of a strong and unscrupulous monarch check-mating the Parliament and governing much as he pleased.

Unfortunately England, perhaps out of fear of Zaghoul, and King Fuad, possibly out of dread of Abbas Hilmi Pasha, arranged not only to guarantee the King's personal occupation of the old Khedivial throne but also the succession to his heirs, and even to have this inserted in the Constitution. It may be thought that a moral guarantee to the same effect was enjoyed alike by Ismail, Taoufik, and Abbas Hilmi Pashas in the confirmation of their accessions by England when first she had to deal with Egypt. This did not hinder her from dethroning two of the Khedives and altering the order of succession, and probably it would not prevent her from putting out King Fuad or anybody else who in her opinion forfeited her guarantees.

Latterly, however, England has seemed to compromise herself still further with the King, and many Egyptians fear that they may be unable to escape from the ambitions of the Palace, which have been all in the direction of autocracy and subjection of the Parliament and Constitutional government to the will of the Crown.

Neither will it be easy to reconcile the views of



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Egyptians outside the Palace with the irreducible minimum of the requirements of England; and if the King shows himself more inclined to be tractable with England it may well be that, with British consent, he will take the negotiations for the Treaty out of the hands of the Parliament in order to make with England a bargain which would be more advantageous for us than we could easily extract from an Egyptian Government. This is what the Parliament really apprehends, and what it would certainly oppose and resent to the utmost—but probably without success.

We shall therefore have to think very carefully before we conclude, or even enter seriously upon, negotiations that may not meet with the approval of public sentiment.

It is possible, and much to be desired, that since his English experiences King Fuad may alter his attitude and, with the prospect of larger authority than he or any other ruler in Egypt has been given by England, may abandon voluntarily his antipathy to all parliamentary control and become a really constitutional king.

Up to now it has been England who has been responsible to the world for the good government of the country, and the Egyptians have been compelled to bow to her guidance, but if in the future responsibility arises for any unpopular or abusive administration it will not be England but the king who will be the object of enmity.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

And unless we, in virtue of our guarantees given to the King, consider it necessary to support him by force (*per fas et nefas*) the Parliament would probably find means in a very short time to depose him and establish another rule or ruler in his place.

This is the contingency that we are bound to face and to consider, unless we are prepared to override the will and possible action of the people again, as we did in the time of Arâbi, with the alternative of annexing the country. There are many Englishmen, of course, who hold the opinion that a great mistake was made when we proclaimed a Protectorate at the outbreak of the War instead of simply annexing. This must always be a matter of opinion.

But if we did not do so at that time it would be a pitiful ending to all our muddling of the Egyptian Question if we were to end where we might have begun. At the date of writing these lines (November, 1927) there is no very clear indication of the intentions of Britain or of Egypt. It may probably be taken for granted that both sides have had enough of the long struggle, and would welcome any give-and-take solution. The visit of King Fuad to London and other European capitals has created a great impression in Egypt, and it is perhaps not too much to hope that it has also done a good deal to change the ideas of His Majesty.

He was accompanied during a considerable part of his absence by Sarwat Pasha, the Premier, who was

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

supposed to have been sent as a people's watch-dog. But there is no reason to suspect that the royal visitor, in London at least, was foolish enough to initiate any line of personal policy. And, after London, he would not probably be more so in other capitals. On the other hand Sarwat Pasha was extremely discreet and cautious, having evidently had instructions from Zaghloul how far he could go by himself or with the King. When Zaghloul died, however, the situation changed kaleidoscopically, even if there was no instant outward change in the political attitude of the Wafd or of other Parties.

It opened new horizons to Sarwat, who, however, could not proceed further with preliminaries without learning how far he might be able to count on the support of a sure Parliamentary majority in the negotiations. He at once returned to London and communicated to Sir A. Chamberlain his view on the situation, and then started for Cairo. He arrived within a day of the landing of King Fuad, and found for the first time a semblance at any rate of popular enthusiasm displayed for King Fuad, in spite of efforts of the extremists to prevent any of the Wafd from sharing in the demonstrations in Alexandria or Cairo. The Parliament was quickly opened by a Speech from the Throne which promised an immediate grappling with needed internal reforms on a large scale, and also an opening of negotiations with the

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Powers for the abolition or modification of the Capitulations, one of the most grievous plagues of Egypt in the abuses they have often allowed. The leadership of the Wafd was taken by Moustafa Nahas Pasha, and he began in apparent complete agreement with the Coalition Cabinet of Sarwat to attack the formidable programme outlined in the Speech above cited.

Writing at this period in the history of Egypt, it would be unwise to attempt to prophesy the future. This, however, does not preclude a brief consideration of the position at the end of 1927.

The immediate problem is the attainment of a Treaty, Pact, or whatever it may be called, calculated to settle for a long time to come the conditions under which Great Britain is disposed to give Egypt the real independence promised to, but not yet enjoyed by her. As far as is compatible with her ideas, England is to yield up all species of control by British officials and by officers with troops, who are to be withdrawn as soon as the Egyptians can satisfy her that they will undertake and are capable of guaranteeing the safety of all Imperial and foreign interests.

The terms of reference seem broadly to be comprised, as to British requirements, in the Declaration of 1922; and as to Egyptian ambitions, in the "Istiklal et Tam", or complete independence, as understood and elaborated by Zaghloul and his successors, as an inherent right.

At first sight any agreement appears outside the

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

bounds of practical politics, and the matter will require delicate and skilful handling, since the parties start from almost opposite poles.

The first and obvious condition of sovereign independence is the absence of foreign troops or ships and other warlike engines from any occupation of the territory or harbours of the independent State. But the four reserved points specifically provide not only this but for British nominees with British staffs, in control of all means of transport and communications; and whilst Egypt still claims condominium, at least, in the Soudan, the handling of this question by Lord Allenby, and subsequent Ministerial statements in London, should have convinced every sensible Egyptian that there is no use in endeavouring to move us from our present attitude. All that they should hope for, and all that they need or could deal with, is an assurance of a full water supply. They are certainly not yet qualified in any way to manage that latest-born and ever-growing offspring of Father Nile.

If we consider the generality of the Egyptian claims side by side with the exigencies of the Declaration, it must be seen at once that the Egyptians have already seriously stultified their position by the measure of co-operation they have afforded in every administration since 1922. It was then laid down that they could only enjoy their Constitution and their independence by accepting the Declaration as a whole, and *after*

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

coming to terms over the reserved points. This was an antecedent condition to Treaty-making. Nevertheless, in their eagerness to begin at all events to feel their new freedom the Egyptians even went to the length, in June, 1927, of coming to an agreement with the Foreign Office for the further employment, on contract, of certain high British officials. In making this arrangement the Foreign Office does not appear to have raised the objection that the whole of the Declaration was not yet accepted in Egypt. After having done this many, if not all, of the Egyptians still insist on a bag-and-baggage clearance of all English control out of the country. They must understand though that they cannot have it both ways, and that they are so deeply committed to co-operation that they should be prepared to go much further in order to obtain what they want, or anything near it.

With whom will the negotiations be made on the Egyptian side? For nearly ten years past, and certainly since the appointment of Lord Lloyd, the Nationalists have looked on the High Commissioner as an ally and protection against the Palace; but since the return of the King, if not already before, they have seen him supported against them. If they can be persuaded that the King is wholly on their side, i.e. on the side of Egypt, it will mean a new distribution of forces. As soon as the Parliament gets to work in earnest on the programme of internal reforms outlined in the King's Speech, it

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

will be easier to see how far there is a prospect of unity in the Chamber, and how far Parliament is likely to be backed or interfered with by the King. At present it is impossible to judge, nor is it of importance, since all this question may have been decided long before these lines are published.

Few Egyptians yet believe that King Fuad has changed his spots, even though they may let off fireworks and throng the gardens to kiss his hand for the sake of the honours paid in Europe to him, and through him to their country. Was not their King met at Victoria Station by the King of England, and does that not show how respectful is the fear he inspired in London? But this is only a transient ebullition of sentiment, probably, and it will require a great deal of solid material proof to convince Egypt that the policy and designs of the Palace, so often demonstrated heretofore, have been magically transformed into constitutionalism.

The reconciling of the British and Egyptian *desiderata* into a treaty is a miracle that also may be accomplished ere these lines are printed, and it seems superfluous to enter into further consideration of this subject. On the other hand, the signature and ratification of the treaty may take longer than optimists are predicting at the end of 1927.

It is not easy to guess at what point or at what common angle the discussions are to be approached.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Does England positively and literally intend to hold to her Declaration and to use her own "free discretion" as to where and how she is to maintain her troops of occupation? Can either the Parliament or the King accept this as full independence? Will not the first effort be directed to show whether this uncontrolled occupation is actually and materially necessary to protect British communications and our manifold interests? Or cannot some alternative system be found to satisfy the Egyptians as well as ourselves? There must be some lurking hope of finding another way of meeting the claims so uncompromisingly upheld hitherto by each party. It almost looks as if the *sine qua non* will be the acceptance by England of such guarantees as Egypt can afford that the Egyptians have acquired the requisite degree of capacity and efficiency not only to govern themselves but to safeguard and protect herself and all foreign interests under their care.

Great play has always been made over foreign interests and minorities, but it has yet to be shown that armed forces from England on the spot are required for their preservation. There has never been any serious complaint from any colony, community, or class, of oppression or flagrant injustice suffered at the hands of Egyptians; and it is rather the Egyptians who think that they are wronged by foreigners under the Capitulations, and by England and her ubiquitous



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

domination. There seems already considerable reason to hope that as far as legal justice and liberties go there is a chance of coming to an agreement with the Powers to give the old Consular jurisdiction under the Capitulations to the Mixed Tribunals, and this would dispose of many ancient causes of offence if it could be managed.

The régime of the Capitulations, or extraterritoriality, has already ceased to exist in most civilized, and even semi-civilized, countries. Japan, Turkey, and to a large extent China, have done away with it; and in several countries protected by other Great Powers such as France and Italy, the world has dropped its capitulatory privileges in return for the international pledge given by the protecting Power.

Repeated efforts made by England and Egypt to obtain the same treatment for the latter have never met with any success up to now. The only explanation offered for this persistent refusal is that the British and/or Egyptian guarantee does not afford the requisite character of permanence; and until the relations between the two countries are internationally fixed and recognized this is a justifiable reason. Of course, if we were to sign a comprehensive treaty with Egypt all such questions would be settled, and were any guarantee then required it would be difficult for any Power to quibble over accepting it.

In his book, published in the early summer of

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

1927, Mr. G. Young goes at considerable length into the problems that face the treaty-makers, and he does not evidently think that there is any practical use in keeping two or three battalions of troops in Cairo when we hold the Soudan, and are predominant on sea and in the air. He does not believe in the danger of any foreign invasion; and if such a surprise could be sprung on us, he does not calculate that any troops we might have in the country would count in the balance. Nor will anyone else think so. The best assurance of safety for our Imperial communications is a loyal, contented, and prosperous population in Egypt, and not scattered garrisons, or even aeroplanes and ships.

The capacity of the Egyptians to govern themselves must always be a matter of opinion, and the opinions of each will probably be very divergent. But it is hard to see how England can contest this capacity at present. If she does so seriously it is a confession of complete failure of the effort of forty years to instruct them in the art of self-government. At the end of 1927 England in the course of a few months came to an agreement with Irak to withdraw all control and her mandate, and present her with complete independence in return for her undertaking to govern, protect, and finance herself for two and a half years, after which England will sponsor her at the font of the League of Nations. This of course implies, above all, that Irak's capacity

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

to do all that may be required of her to safeguard British interests and worthily fill her place in the family of nations is recognized by England in the fullest sense.

Yet how can the two countries be compared? Egypt is rich, prosperous, has been under modern systems of government for nearly a hundred years, and for half a century under the ægis of England. She has been ruled under that guidance by a dynasty of her own identified with the people, and by Ministers and Governors of her own race and birth. Irak has been governed during the same time by the Ottoman Turks until after the War, when she was put under the mandate of England and the immediate rule of an alien King brought from the centre of Arabia, one of the sons of a king of the Hedjâz, who himself had been sent there from Constantinople (See Appendix No. 5). The Prime Minister who negotiated the recent Treaty is also an alien, an ex-Turkish army Pasha, and the country itself is far more exposed to danger of attack and defeat from her neighbours on all sides than Egypt, and with hardly existent defensive equipment or resources.

Nevertheless, Irak has been released from all British tutelage, and deemed capable of protecting herself and the Imperial interests of England without any apparent hesitation or misgiving—unless perhaps on the part of the Iraklis.

Within a week of the signature of this Treaty in

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

London, Parliament was prorogued by a speech from His Majesty King George, in which it is said :

The visit of the King of Egypt was a source of gratification to Me, and afforded an opportunity for a full exchange of views between the Egyptian Prime Minister and My Foreign Secretary. The frank and friendly nature of these conversations was in itself of good augury for the future, and it is My hope that their outcome may prove of lasting benefit to both countries.

If words mean anything, the signification in the language of diplomacy is that something more than preliminary conversations took place in London, and that a basis of agreement has been found. But though this may have appeared to the two foreign Ministers to be so, there are still the Egyptian Parliament and the King, who have to be reckoned with, and Sarwat was very careful not to commit himself to any too optimistic statements. There does, however, seem to exist a hope that has certainly never been felt hitherto, that there is a possibility of mixing fire and water and achieving the unachievable, and at that we had better leave it for time to show.

*December, 1927.*

## POSTSCRIPTUM

UNFORESEEN circumstances prevented the publication of this work last year. But there has been little to alter in what was written in 1927. The international status of Egypt remains yet unchanged. The Treaty that is in contemplation is not yet in process of active negotiation, and the Government is evidently more interested in carrying on its internal business programme, which is a very big one, as long as it is allowed to do so without interference. It feels it does not need the Treaty to have any freer hand than is being given to it. Neither does the Residency appear in any hurry to start arguments on problems which may gradually progress towards a solution, or a considerable preparation for a solution, in the development of Egypt and her revenues. Two of the thorny four *reserved points* were settled without any discussion or difficulty by Lord Allenby after the murder of Sir Lee Stack. It is hardly likely that the question of the Soudan will ever be raised in any acute form. The principal crux is the Capitulations, and that is more for Great Britain and the Powers. The Indemnity to England for her expenses, and to Egypt for requisitions, during the War has lately been settled by mutual agreement, and for the present there does not seem to be any likelihood of touching the Treaty, which may be well left until the Parliamentary régime is re-established, although it might possibly be easier to finish with it earlier.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

Mohamed Mahmoud Pasha is proving the strongest Premier that Egypt has known. He came, of course, to the position at the wish of the Residency, and no Minister now can reach or hold office without British support. As long as he has that support he fears no opposition, unless it be some occasional objection on personal matters from the Palace.

He is the first Premier with any first-hand knowledge of British mentality, gained by him at Oxford. He consequently is better able to understand us than most Orientals, but this does not make him any the less an out-and-out Egyptian, and it will be remembered that he was once a prominent member of the Wafd, and accompanied Zaghloul in his first exile. He has revived a political creed and party that was first born under Lord Cromer; and though at first several of his colleagues were far from seeing eye to eye with him, he has now practically all the members of the Government in agreement with him. His Party—the old “*Hizb el 'Omma*”—may be called a Liberal Constitutional one of realization, essentially Egyptian, whilst recognizing the need of co-operation as cordial as may be as long as Egypt remains nominally, as she must always be actually, dependent on British power and backing.

Until the Treaty is signed Egypt remains, in the terms of the Declaration, *de jure* under the Protectorate, and under the control of several high British functionaries whom she has accepted to supervise her progress,

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

with the Residency at the top. But she is being given greater freedom than she has ever before enjoyed to prove that she is able to guarantee all Imperial and other interests of Great Britain, and those of foreigners entrusted to them both.

There has been an enormous influx since the War of Armenians from Turkey and Jews from Palestine, and these are a valuable commercial asset. The country is steadily increasing in population and wealth, and this all counts towards the final independence she aims at.

Of course there is still a big potential Wafd opposition which hopes to come to power when Parliament meets again, and stoutly refuses to accept most of the measures that have been passed since the dissolution. But they are not in a position to make themselves heard or felt openly, and are like sheep without a shepherd, and more or less content to march with the times, whatever they may think.

It is to a certain extent satisfactory to learn that the Financial Commission, instituted by Law 28, lately published in the Official Journal that it held a sum of £25,000 at the disposal of His Highness the Ex-Khedive, Abbas Hilmi Pasha, but it has rendered no accounts of its stewardship since 1922, or of what has been done with the Wakf revenues of Abbas Pasha since 1914.

Nashat Pasha has left the Palace for the Embassy at Berlin to which he has been appointed, so that it may

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

be concluded that he has been pardoned by the Residency if not by the people.

On the whole there has been very little for any Egyptian to complain of since Mahmoud Pasha came to power. And still less for England, which sees small political agitation either in the country or in the Palace, and seldom has to offer more than a suggestion to see it carried out. Progress in the Soudan is very rapid, and it bids fair soon to become a gold-mine in itself and to add huge areas of cultivation to Lower Egypt when the new water supply is furnished, which will not now be long before it is available.

When the time comes for Lord Lloyd to quit the Residency for some more exalted destiny he will leave a comparatively easy task for his successor, if there is ever to be another High Commissioner. He will probably remain, however, to conclude the Treaty, and the new position will not again be the same as it has been since the days of Lord Cromer. Lord Lloyd's years of office have called for all the energy and self-confidence that characterize him, and he can justly claim almost unqualified success for his tenure of office in Egypt.

Egypt is now in a state of evolution, and it is impossible to predict what the future may hold. It would be foolish to attempt to prophesy. Neither is it the province of a simple chronicler.

A. H. B. 1928.





# APPENDICES



## APPENDIX I

THE respective positions of the Khedive, Arâbi Pasha, and the Nationalists in the Assembly were not very clear for some time before the Bombardment—and changed from time to time. Both the Khedive and the Assembly occasionally leaned towards the Turks, as the other Parties seemed to be getting too much power, and the Khedive often seemed to be agreed with Arâbi, when he was secretly negotiating with the British and the French. In the trial of Arâbi,<sup>1</sup> it was evident that the Khedive had approved his action—though perhaps through fear more than wish—up to the very end. But he frequently showed his dislike of all the Military movement, by his several attempts to keep Arâbi out of the Cabinet and even to send him out of Egypt. Up to the bombardment nobody really appeared to know on which side he was, though none approved the hot-and-cold attitude of Taoufik Pasha.

The following is the translation of a petition sent to the Sultan when the Khedive had tried to dismiss the Arâbi Ministry, and deport him and his trusty Colonels. I have never seen this document quoted (though, of course, it may have escaped me), and it is interesting as showing how entirely the country was with the Army, even to the Princes of the Royal Family. I found the original by accident when I was in Cairo in 1926.

<sup>1</sup> In which I was watching the case for the British Government with Sir Ch. Wilson.

# *Dethronement of the Khedive*

13th Ramadan, 1882.

[June.]

*To H.E. Bessim Bey, Grand Chamberlain to  
H.I.M. Abdul Hamid.*

Referring to our previous petition of the 4th Ramadan, protesting against the order of the Khedive dismissing Arâbi Pasha, Minister of War and Marine:—

To-day we called a great meeting of the Egyptian Nation at the Ministry of Interior (Kasr en Nil) to examine this question.

Those present included all the Nobles, both Civil and Military, the Grand Kâdi (Turkish), all the Sheikhs of the Azhar and the 'Ulema, the Patriarchs, the Omdehs of Upper and Lower Egypt, the Members of the Khedivial Family, and all the Merchants and Notables now in Cairo:

And they unanimously decided to delegate the undersigned to present to your Excellency the following resolution bearing the signatures and seals of the most famous of the two thousand present.

*(Signatures of Under-Secretaries, dated 13th Ramadan.)*

ALI ROUBI PASHA,  
Soudan Government.

ARABAN BEY,  
Finance.

ISMAIL MOHAMED,  
Public Works.

ALI FEHMY,  
Public Instruction.

HASSAN FEHMY,  
Wakfs.

BOUTROS GHALI,  
Justice.

YACCOUB SAMI,  
War.

MOHAMED PASHA DARAMÂLI,  
Interior.

# *Dethronement of the Khedive*

## RESOLUTION

Having read the orders and decrees of the Khedive, notably the Decree dismissing Arâbi Pasha,—and after reading the communiqué of Arâbi, and listening to the Under-Secretary for War, as such, and as President of this meeting which directs all the administration of the country, We, the undersigned, resolve—

Are we to carry out the orders of the Khedive, who with all his Ministers remains at Alexandria under the protection of the British?

If he orders us are we to execute his orders when we see the British troops and Fleet on the shores of Egypt, and Arâbi Pasha resisting in defence of Egypt?

We are compelled to consider him as still Minister of War, and Chief of the Army.

And we resolve no longer to carry out the orders of the Khedive and his Ministers at Alexandria in any Ministry or Administration:

Because the Khedive has transgressed the rules and laws of Egypt, we have decided as above, in order that the Under-Secretaries may present our decision to Your Excellency.

Here follow a hundred or so of signatures, amongst which may be noticed those of Prince Ibrahim, father of Prince Seif-eddin, Prince Hamid, brother of Princess Nazli, and Prince Kemâl, father of Prince Youssef Kemâl.

## APPENDIX II

### LAW 28

TRANSLATION FROM THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE  
EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT DATED 19TH JULY 1922

Law No. 28 of 1922 regulating the Liquidation of the  
properties of the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha and  
restricting his Rights.

WE, KING OF EGYPT,

In view of Our Rescript dated 15 Chaaban 1340  
(13th April 1922) establishing the order of Succession  
to the Throne:

Considering on the one part that there should be a  
Liquidation of the Properties of Abbas Hilmi Pasha,  
deposed from the Khedivate of Egypt, which was agreed  
upon by the British Military Authority under the powers  
of Martial Law.

Considering, on the other part, that it is necessary in  
order to preserve the Order established for the Succession  
to the Throne to restrain the rights which the said Abbas  
Hilmi Pasha could exercise in the future in this Country:

On the advice of Our Council of Ministers

WE DECREE as follows:—

*Article 1.*—All acts relating to the properties liquidated  
as belonging to the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha in  
Egypt, including the sales, assignments, transfers and any  
other measures referring to the Liquidation of these  
properties are by the present Law confirmed and recognized

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

as valid, regular, and final as against Abbas Hilmi Pasha as well as all other persons whatever.

As a result, no action, either actually pending and not decided, or to be brought later on the part of the above-mentioned or of any quite other person with the object of causing either directly or indirectly the annulment, retractation or modification of any one of the said acts or measures, will be admissible before any Jurisdiction of the Country and must be rejected as of right and finally.

*Article 2.*—Egyptian Territory is forbidden to the Ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha. In case of any contravention, he will immediately be re-conducted to the Frontier by the Executive Power.

He shall not either personally or through an intermediary exercise there any political right, possess or acquire either subject to payment or gratuitously except through legal succession or through rights acquired, any property movable or immovable; be named a Beneficiary of a Wakf to be made, encash any sum of money, exercise the functions of Nazir of Wakfs, Guardian, Curator, Mandatory or any analogous Office, nor plead before any Jurisdiction except through the Intermediary designated in Article 4.

*Article 3.*—Any movable or immovable property, sum or credit acquired in contravention of the enactment contained in the second paragraph of the preceding Article, shall be confiscated to the profit of the State.

All other property, movable or immovable, sum or credit legally coming to Abbas Hilmi Pasha shall be seized administratively by the Administration designated in the article following. The real or personal property shall be sold by Auction.



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

The nett proceeds of the management and liquidation of the said properties, sums, or credits shall be carried annually to the credit of Abbas Hilmi Pasha or any other person having his rights and the total shall be published by notice in the Official Journal.

Any amounts not claimed by the above-mentioned persons within one year from the publication of such Notice shall be forfeited to the State Treasury.

*Article 4.*—The Council of Ministers shall appoint the Administration of the State charged with the provision of the measures indicated in the preceding Articles and in general with the management, administration and Legal representation of the interests active and passive of Abbas Hilmi Pasha within the Limits and dispositions of the present Law.

*Article 5.*—Our Ministers are charged, each so far as concerns him, with the execution of the present Law, and Our Ministers of the Interior and Finance are particularly authorized to take any necessary measure by Decree for the said execution thereof.

The present Law comes into force from its publication in the Official Journal.

Done at the Palace of Ras Et Tin,

22 Zilkadah 1340 (17 July 1922).

By the King.

FOUAD

*(Signatures of Ministers appended.)*

## APPENDIX III

### TRANSLATION. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT

Decree-Law, interpretative of Law No. 28 of 1922 governing the liquidation of the properties of the Ex-Khedive, Abbas Hilmi Pasha, and restricting his rights.

#### STATEMENT OF THE MOTIVES

The disposition of Article 2 of Law No. 28 governing the liquidation of the properties of the Ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha, and restricting his rights, has not always been interpreted in the sense desired by those who drew up the law. Although the above-mentioned Article 2 distinctly states that the Ex-Khedive cannot plead in law before any Court except through the Administration described in Article 4, it has been argued that this interdiction was not absolute, and that a distinction must be made between the active and passive interests arising out of the rights recognized by Law No. 28 of 1922 and the so-called personal actions: that this deprivation of rights should be limited to the limits of the object aimed at by the Law, i.e. in view of ensuring the maintenance of the order established for the succession to the Throne; that the Commission constituted in virtue of Article 4 of the Law had but a very restricted competence; and that, outside that competence, the Ex-Khedive could plead either personally, or through his Daïra, or through any representative he chose.

In a question which touches so closely the maintenance of public order and dynastic interests, the Government has decided that it was its duty to define by legislation the

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

sense that should be given to the disposition of Article 2 of Law 28 of 1922, and it is for this reason that the hereto annexed draft of a law had been prepared by the preceding Ministry with the intention of securing an interpretation of this disposition in conformity with the intentions of the legislator.

And whereas it is urgent to promulgate this interpretative law in view of cases now pending before the Tribunals, it is proposed forthwith to embody it in a Decree-Law, to be submitted ulteriorly to the Parliament according to Article 41 of the Constitution.

The circumstances under which Law 28 of 1922 was drawn up confirm the formal text of Article 2 in this sense that the Ex-Khedive cannot plead in Egypt in any capacity, or before any Court whatsoever.

He is necessarily represented in any case by the State Administrator appointed for that purpose, and it is for the latter to plead the whole case, and raise questions of competence or others that it may be necessary to raise in the defence of the Ex-Khedive. It is likewise the duty of this Administration to bring any actions it may be required to enter to protect the interests of the Ex-Khedive in Egypt.

The interpretative character of the law now proposed explains the effect that it necessarily must have on suits now pending, and which were not brought in conformity with Law 28 of 1922. Suits wrongly brought must in all circumstances be declared inadmissible, and thrown out by right and *ex-officio*, saving always the right of the parties concerned to renew their suit according to the requirements of Law 28 as it is above interpreted, i.e. against or through the intermediary of the State Adminis-

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

tration especially appointed to represent the interests of the ex-Khedive before the Courts, and in Egypt.

(Signed) President of the Council,

AHMED ZIWER

WE, FOUAD I, KING OF EGYPT,

Considering Article 41 of the Constitution:

Considering Law No. 28 of 1922, governing the liquidation of the properties of the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha, and restricting his rights.

Considering that Article 2 of the said Law 28 of 1922 provides that the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha cannot plead before any jurisdiction except through the Administration described in Article 4

And that this test has given rise to doubts of interpretation, and that it is necessary and urgent to put an end to these doubts by legislation:

On the advice of our Council of Ministers:—

### DECREE

*Article 1.*—The disposition of Article 2 of Law 28 of 1922 which states that the Ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha cannot plead before any jurisdiction save through the Administration appointed in Article 4 of the said Law, must be taken in the sense that the above-mentioned Administration alone is qualified to represent all the rights and interests, both patrimonial and personal, of the Ex-Khedive in every lawsuit or action of any nature whatsoever, and before no matter which jurisdiction of the country,—and that in no case can the Ex-Khedive appear in Court, *either in his own name, or by his Daira, or any*

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

*sequestrator, liquidator, administrator, or other person whatever, either as Plaintiff or Defendant, or in any other capacity.*<sup>1</sup>

Wherefore:—

- (1) Every suit or action, brought or pending, by or against the ex-Khedive, whether in his own name, or by his Daïra or any sequestrator, liquidator, administrator, or other person whatsoever shall be, under all circumstances, declared inadmissible, and thrown out *ex-officio* as of right, saving always the right of the parties concerned to renew their suits or actions against or through the above-mentioned Administration.
- (2) *Every summons, or generally, any act of procedure in the interests of or against him shall not be accepted, notified, or executed unless it be done at the request of or against the above-mentioned Administration.*

*Article 2.*—Our Ministers of Interior, Finance, and Justice, each in as far as he is concerned, are charged with executing the present law, which will come into force as soon as it is published in the Official Journal.

The present law will be submitted to Parliament at its first sitting.

Done at Abdin Palace the 3rd Gamad Tani 1343  
(29 December 1924).

(Signed) FOUAD

And countersigned by Ziwer and the three Ministers concerned.

<sup>1</sup> The italics are the author's.

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

This law was not presented to Parliament until 1927, when it was not ratified, and consequently is no longer valid. It served its purpose, nevertheless, during the year that it had the temporary force of law.

## APPENDIX IV

### SENTENCE OF THE MIXED ANGLO-TURKISH ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL OF CONSTANTINOPLE

[*Translation.*]

ABBAS HILMI PASHA *v.* THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

The Mixed Anglo-Turkish Arbitral Tribunal composed of M. K. Hemmerich, President; Memdough Bey, Turkish Arbitrator; H. D. K. Grimston, British Arbitrator, with his Clerk, M. F. Grandchamp,—sitting at Constantinople.

CONSIDERING the Memorial presented by His Highness Abbas Hilmi, former Khedive of Egypt, requiring the condemning of the British Government to the payment of £2,823,102 11s. 3d. on account of the liquidation of the properties hereafter mentioned, plus interest and costs:—

CONSIDERING the Special Memorial presented by the British Government to the effect that the Tribunal should declare itself incompetent, and condemn the Plaintiff in costs:—

CONSIDERING the other documents in the case, namely,—

- (a) The letter of the 12th June 1926, put in by the Plaintiff, together with the Counter Memorial, and the Counter reply of the Plaintiff;
- (b) The reply of the Defendant;
- (c) The conclusions presented by the General Agent of the British Government, and after hearing Sir Maurice Amos for the British Government on the

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

10-11th May 1927, Maître Tahir Bey, M.M. Gaston Bergery and Jacques Kayser for the Plaintiff,—as also Wasfy Reshid Bey Turkish Agent, and Mr. Owen-Wells, British Agent:—

### IN FACT:—

Whereas, the Plaintiff, who since 1892 occupied the throne of Egypt, and who at the outbreak of the world-war was out of Egypt, was, whilst he was living in Constantinople deposed from the Khedivate by the British Authorities:

The properties, right, and interests that the Plaintiff possessed in Egypt were sequestered by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, and subsequently sold and liquidated, likewise by the act of the British Authorities:

The latter paid to the Plaintiff the produce of the liquidation—namely the sum of £605,000, notwithstanding which the Plaintiff claims that the liquidation was not effected in a way to ensure the obtention of a fair price, and consequently he asks the Tribunal to increase the produce of the liquidation by an equitable sum which he estimates at £2,825,102 11s. 3d.

### IN LAW:—

Whereas the Plaintiff, who claims to be a Turkish national, and as such to benefit by the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, bases himself on Articles 65 and 66 of the Treaty to maintain that the properties in question were situated in Egypt, and that this country is detached from the Ottoman Empire in virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne, and further that on the 29th October 1914, it was under the *de facto* protectorate of Great Britain,



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

and in consequence that the territorial conditions required by Article 65, paragraph 2 of the Treaty are fulfilled, and that, on the other hand, the provisions of Article 19 of the Treaty cannot prevent the competence of the Tribunal:—this latter article, instead of being included amongst the economic clauses is to be found in the part of the Treaty devoted to political clauses, and only relates to claims brought against the Egyptian State, without excluding actions brought against any other Power.

Whereas, nevertheless this thesis—that the Treaty reserved to all whom it might concern the right to attack the British Government as far as the liquidation of properties lying in Egypt goes,—is of a nature to give rise to serious doubts: first of all it must be taken into consideration the fact that Egypt even before the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne had been proclaimed an independent State,—that Article 19 of the Treaty in this connection reads—“Subsequent stipulations will govern questions that arise from the recognition of the Egyptian State to which the provisions of the present Treaty relative to territories detached from Turkey by virtue of the said Treaty, do not apply,” this text is drawn up in very wide terms, and its literal tenor comprises not only actions *against* Egypt as a political organism, but also every action touching the territory of that country:—

the interpretation in the sense that Article 19 relates exclusively to actions brought against the Egyptian State does not seem very natural if we remember that the Egyptian Government was not represented as such at the Lausanne Conference, and does not figure amongst the signatories of the Treaty,—so that it would have been completely superfluous to insert in it a special provision

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

in order to declare that the Treaty cannot be used to bring actions *against* the Egyptian Government:

the argument drawn from the position of the Article loses its importance when we think that this article was inserted in one of the fundamental chapters of the Treaty that defines, in a general fashion, its whole application, and thus including also economic clauses, such as Article 18—and moreover, the mere position of the article is not enough to restrict its meaning, unless such a restrictive interpretation is not justified by other considerations.

Whereas, on the other hand the argument of the Plaintiff seems irreconcilable with the system of Section I of the economic clauses of the Treaty, more especially with the principles on which Articles 65 and 66 are based; as a matter of fact Article 68 of the Treaty eliminates in principle all money claims against the contracting Powers for loss and damage sustained through the great war: and the various dispositions of Article 65 presuppose that, the contracting Powers cannot be held responsible for restoring sequestered property unless the territories in which these properties are situated are “to-day”, i.e. at the date of the signature of the Treaty, under their sovereignty or authority,—a condition that Article 65 repeats wherever necessary, reiterating it even up to three times in its paras. 2 and 3.

Whereas the same applies to the liability to pay, in cases provided for by Article 66, an additional sum over and above the product of the liquidation:—this last liability must not be taken as implying an indemnity granted outside the principle consecrated in Article 58,—it is nothing but an equivalent to restitution of the actual

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

property and subject to the same rules: according to the formal laws of Article 66 it can only take place in the case of property "whose restitution is provided for by Article 65," and when it is also supposed that the liquidated properties can be made the object of a restitution, and that they are situated on the above-indicated territories.

Whereas, it thus results from the dispositions of Articles 65 and 66, that the interested Powers did not desire, after the signature of the Treaty to assume any responsibility for the restitution of property situated on territories that at that time were no longer subject to their authority or placed under their protectorate:—that nothing shows that Article 19 intended to depart from this principle, but, on the contrary the tenor of this Article appears only to contain the confirmation of the application of this principle to property situated in Egypt, which already, since the 22nd February 1922 formed an independent State.

And whereas the Labours preparatory to the Lausanne Treaty which the Plaintiff has likewise invoked in his favour in no way confirm the admissibility of his claim, and he is wrong in maintaining that the negotiations at the time of the Lausanne Conference show that Articles 65 and 66 were drawn up with the intention of making them applicable to Egypt:—

Whereas, on this point, it appears from the Minutes of the Conference that a discussion took place between the British and Turkish delegations on the measure taken regarding the property of the Plaintiff, and that when Articles 72 and 72 *bis* (now 65 and 66) came up for consideration the first Turkish Delegate declared that he could not accept the text proposed for the said Articles, save

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

under reserve of a settlement of the question relative to the properties of Turkish Nationals in Egypt—the British Delegate, on the 3rd July 1923 made a declaration for the settlement of the question, adding that the properties claimed by Abbas Hilmi Pasha, which had been made the object of special arrangements, did not come under the head of the properties referred to in his declaration:—and thereupon the first Turkish Delegate withdrew his reserve, to re-assert it on the 22nd July, 1923, by stating that the Turkish Government was “in the position of having taken no engagement” regarding the British declaration in the matter of Abbas Hilmi Pasha:—to which the British Delegate replied on the 27th July 1923 that the “arrangements he referred to could give rise to no question between the British and Turkish Governments”, and that it was for this reason that he had thought fit formally to except the case of Abbas Hilmi Pasha from those coming under his declaration of the 3rd July.

Whereas it appears from this discussion that both parties started from the supposition that the disposition of Articles 65 and 66 were of a nature to exclude the claims of the Plaintiff, since if it were not so there would be no ground for making reservations,—

Whereas these reservations did not bring about any modification of the text of Articles 65 and 66 which, notwithstanding, were signed as they stood,—that it is this signature which determines the engagements of the High Contracting Parties, and that the above-mentioned declaration of the 22nd July, made by the Turkish Delegation outside the Treaty cannot be taken to saddle the British Government with a responsibility which is not implied in the signed text, and which the British Delegate, before

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

the signature, had formally declined by the above-quoted declaration.

Whereas, to sum up, the retro-active interpretation put by the Plaintiff on Article 19 cannot be maintained, and, on the other hand, the text of Article 19, or the system on which the Articles 65 and following ones are based, or the preparatory labours for the Treaty,—all show that Articles 65 and 66 are not applicable to properties situated in Egypt—therefore we must accept the objection raised by the British Government, the competence of the Tribunal not having been established to the satisfaction of the law—without there being ground to pronounce on the merits of the arguments advanced by the Defendant concerning the nationality of the Plaintiff, or the character of the measures taken in the matter of his properties.

WHEREFORE—The Tribunal declares itself incompetent.

Puts the costs and expenses of the procedure, fixed at £T.250 to be paid by the Plaintiff who has deposited them.

Condemns the Plaintiff to pay to the British Government the sum of £T.500 for its costs.

Constantinople, 29 June 1927.

Turkish Member.	The President.	British Member.
(Signed)	(Signed)	
MEMDOUH.	K. HEMMERICH.	H D. K. GRIMSTON.

True copy.

The President.	The Clerk of the Tribunal.
(Signed)	(Signed)

## APPENDIX V

KING HUSSEIN, Shereef of Mecca, the man selected by Colonel Lawrence to act as our ally in the War from amongst all the powerful and influential Emirs of Arabia, had a chequered career. For at least fifteen years he lived at Stenia, a small village below Therapia on the Bosphorus, where he brought up his numerous family with no small difficulty. He had little or no money beyond the very problematical and irregular pay he could extract from the Privy Purse of the Sultan, and the pickings he could glean from his position as Councillor of State. This was but an empty dignity, as the Council was never consulted by Abdul Hamid, but it was supposed to carry with it a mysterious influence occasionally worth paying for.

After the revolution in Turkey, however, something else had to be discovered, and Councillor Hussein thought that he might get some post abroad if one fell vacant. It happened that after a short while Abdullah Pasha was named to the Shereefian dignity, and died within three weeks of taking up the place.

Arabia had never been an envied appointment, and for a while nobody offered himself to replace the defunct. Hussein, however, did not scruple to assert that he was in a position to render great services to Turkey if he were sent to the Holy City, and that he possessed the necessary qualifications of birth by connection with the Koreish family. Finding, nevertheless, that these talents and qualities were not sufficiently highly prized, he applied to the son of the Grand Vizier, whom he knew, to whom it was said that he paid about four thousand pounds, which he contrived to borrow from a confiding official on

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

the promise of repayment within a year. The story was well known to everyone at Constantinople in official circles at that time, and it is also said, though I can only repeat the tale, that the debt is still owing. At any rate, he started off with all his family and belongings, little dreaming probably of the high destinies in store for them all.

The British Consuls-General at Jeddah can best tell what they and others have suffered from the vagaries of the newly imported Shereef. It was this extraordinary potentate that Colonel Lawrence chose to pelt with sacks of golden sovereigns, and whose sons have since risen to be Kings in their turn of Irak and Transjordania.

The ignorance and eccentricity of Hussein could be illustrated by a hundred anecdotes of his actions, and I cannot refrain from relating one which I heard from another reverend Sheikh, who was a great crony of Hussein's and of mine. He always claimed that he was a much closer relative of the Prophet than Hussein, who knew this and had a deep respect for him. I have certainly seen a lengthy pedigree to this effect certified by the Sheikh ul Islam, and he was generally looked up to by the public in Cairo and Egypt generally as a most learned, if not holy, doctor. I had not seen him for some time when he called in 1920 or thereabouts and said he had been on a visit to King Hussein, who had invited him to Mecca and treated him with signal honours, and asked his advice on many subjects. On my asking what advice he had proffered, and on what matter, he laughed slyly and replied:

"When I arrived at Jeddah, I found a lot of Italians there, and as I sat talking to them and all the crowd in the café I was told that they were there to arrange for a motor service from the coast to Mecca, and to other towns

## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

if they could manage it. They had already got influential helpers in Mecca and had spent a good bit of money, so that they expected confidently to pull it off, and shortly sign the concession. I immediately resolved that they should never have it if I could stop them. Imagine England letting Italians run a motor line in Arabia! Well, in Mecca I was put in the best guest villa next door to the Palace and had it all to myself, and my meals alone with the King, with the most noble of the country standing behind our chairs and waiting on us. I did not say anything until Hussein himself said that he wanted to take counsel with me, and repeated the account that I had heard at Jeddah.

"I looked very severely at him and replied: 'O Hussein, Shereef of the Holy Places! verily I am glad that it is yet time. Do you not see that this is all an evil plot of those *shaitans*, the Italians, who are the sons of Machiavel and born to deceive? With their horrible-smelling, shrieking motor-cars they will ruin all the true Arabs who for generations have carried the faithful and their goods from the sea. Will the tribesmen put up with this? Will they not rather grow angry and lie in wait one day and fall upon these Italians, and perhaps kill one or two and destroy their cars? Then what will happen? The Italians will come with ships and troops and begin a war until they have taken all the Hedjâz. That is all these men at Jeddah want. They do not really mean to work, but to provoke the Arabs to attack them, and then you will see that what I have said will surely happen.'

"As I spoke the King grew very hot and excited and broke out: '*Vallâhi!* You are right, and I have been blind. I will give orders at once to break off all talk, and let nobody ever venture to mention this thing to me again.'"



## *Dethronement of the Khedive*

And so it was done. All attempts on the part of Italy to resume negotiations and obtain the concession were fruitless. It had been sufficient for a visitor from Cairo to instil suspicion into the mind of the half-crazy King for a business of almost international importance to be shelved for ever. I have no doubt whatever of the truth of the story, as I never found out my ancient friend telling me deliberate lies, and it is well known that the scheme for a motor service in the Hedjâz was abandoned about that time.



GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

LONDON: 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.1

CAPE TOWN: 73 ST. GEORGE'S STREET

SYDNEY, N.S.W.: WYNARD SQUARE

AUCKLAND, N.Z.: 41 ALBERT STREET

WELLINGTON, N.Z.: 4 WILLIS STREET

TORONTO, 77 WELLINGTON STREET WEST







